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PREFACE 
This study has two purposes in mind. First, although Korea is 
one of the major puzzles to the understanding of East Asian 
politics, it has been either neglected or misunderstood by the 
American public. Thus this small study is an attempt to shed 
some light on Korean politics in this country. Second, the 
reunification is not a single-dimensional issue in the spectrum of 
Korean politics. An awareness of the political problems of the 
reunification would tremendously enhance understanding of the 
subtlety of Korean politics. 
This modest study is deeply indebted to many institutions and 
individuals. The author wishes to express gratitude to the Library 
of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, the Korean 
National Commission for UNESCO, the Bureau of Statistics of 
the Economic Planning Board, the Korea Land Unification Board, 
the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, and the Research Center for 
Peace and Unification. He would also like to extend his gratitude 
to many individuals who have made this study more meaningful. 
They are Professors Ardath Burks, Richard W. Wilson, and Dr. Se-
Jin Kim, who has supplied this study with many valuable 
materials from Korea. The author is particularly grateful to his 
enduring friend, Robert Cadden, who has in so many ways 
improved this and other studies that this author has published 
over the last several years. He is also gratefully indebted to Dona 
Mcintosh, who has polished many of my papers with her skillful 
typing and editing. Gratitude also goes to Professor Hungdah 
Chiu who took the responsibility to publish this modest study 
without reluctance. Finally, the author is particularly appreciative 
of his wife, Hyon Ja, for her enduring cooperation and great 
patience in coping with the difficulty that the life of a junior 
scholar with three children must face in materializing this small 
study. 
Needless to say, for all errors and shortcomings, the author 
alone bears the responsibilities. 

INTRODUCTION 
The question of Korean unification is perhaps the one that 
has been discussed most in Korean politics in the last few decades 
without a plausible answer. Since the search for solutions and 
answers on various issues and questions involved in the 
unification problem has not been successful, one wonders whether 
the possibility of Korean unification is a reality or a merely 
unobtainable fantasy. Granting that Korean unification is indeed 
an enigmatical problem, why should we, as western political 
scholars, be so concerned with the problem of Korean unification? 
What is the meaning of Korean unification in terms of global 
politics? The answers to these questions can only be ascertained 
by placing the problem of Korean unification in multiple 
perspectives. First, Korean unification is deeply related to political 
stability in the international arena, being a key to the stability of 
Northeast Asia. A perusal of twentieth century history shows that 
the politics of the Korean peninsula had caused or contributed to 
three major wars in recent history; viz., the Sino-Japanese, Russo-
Japanese, and Korean conflicts. More than twenty countries have 
been involved in these three wars. 
Second, the Korean peninsula has always been a key, or at 
least a critical variable, to the stability of the Far East region. 
Particularly, Korea is of vital concern to Japan who has invested 
more than 1.5 billion dollars in South Korea with more investment 
certainly expected in the future. Japan, therefore, desires a stable 
political situation in order to ensure her investments in South 
Korea. Also, Japan has had historically an enduring fear that 
Korea is "a dagger pointing at the heart of Japan." This theory, of 
course, has been a polemic subject among military strategists and 
students of international politics. Whether or not one agrees to 
"the dagger" theory, many Japanese believe it,1 and certainly 
many Japanese leaders express concern over the political 
situation on the Korean peninsula. As Professor W. I. Thomas 
aptly puts it, "If men define situations as real, they are real in 
their consequences."2 · 
Third, Korean unification is certainly related to the progress 
of the economic systems of "concerned countries." Of course 
questions about how and to what extent defense industries 
influence the economic growth of any nation are polemic. It is 
1. See constantly repeated statements of previous and current foreign 
ministers, Kosaka, Hatoyama, and Sonoda, of Japan. 
2. For further discussion on the relationship between perception and reality, 
see Joseph H. de Rivera, The Psychological Dimensu:m of Foreign Policy, 
(Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968). 
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quite clear, however, that any country which spends more than 5 
per cent of its GNP on defense is going to do so at the expense of 
badly needed social services which should have a higher priority. 
As is already well-known, South Korea's defense budget totals 
about six percent of its GNP, and North Korea is expected to 
spend somewhere between fifteen to twenty percent of its GNP for 
military purposes. When compared to the level of economic and 
social development of these two political systems, the expendi-
tures for both military establishments are indeed excessive in 
terms of domestic needs and national resources. Excessive 
military spending is a major factor adversely affecting the 
healthy progress of both Korean societies. 3 Discounting direct 
military and non-military aid given to South Korea in the last few 
decades, the U.S. still maintains more than thirty thousand troops 
in South Korea. Furthermore, the U.S. will also continue to bear 
some of the burden of South Korean defense in the foreseeable 
future. 
Fourth, the division of Korea is, in fact, a product of rivalry in 
the international political arena. It is a division which occurred 
and continues against the wishes of millions of Korean citizens. 
Furthermore, once the country divided into two parts, Korean 
citizens on both sides were practically forced to accept for 
themselves an alien political system; i.e., a capitalistic system in 
the South and a Communist system in the North. Under these 
totally different conditions, the people in each political system 
have been disparately socialized in varying ways to such a great 
degree that eventually Koreans in the two systems have acquired 
different personality and value premises. Various studies, further-
more, indicate that intensive efforts have been made by the 
leaders of each political system to compel ordinary Koreans to 
accept and integrate a disjointed personality system, mainly for 
the purpose of furthering political values and goals. If this 
situation continues to exist, the possibility of reunifying and 
reintegrating Korean society will cease to exist. Clearly, the longer 
the division exists, the more difficult it becomes to integrate the 
two Koreas. Furthermore, Korea has had a unique development as 
a unified nation prior to the unfortunate situation which forced 
her to divide into two parts. As pointed out by a distinguished 
Korean scholar, Jun-yop Kim, "Korean unification demanded by 
3. For a comparison of military capability of two Koreas, see Journal of 
Korean Affairs, (January, 1976), p. 72. 
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history means at once the growth of the Korean nation and the 
condition necessary for Korea's role in the world as a modem 
state."4 Thus, reunification is a prerequisite for Korea to realize its 
full potential as a modem Asian nation state. 
Fifth, reunification will perhaps provide a new and expanded 
role for Korea in international politics. The international role of 
Korea in the past has been severely restrained because the 
division has discouraged both Koreas from pursuing a more 
meaningful and active role in the world political arena. Both 
Koreas have constantly diminished their influence in interna-
tional affairs by bickering with each other. Furthermore, each side 
has attempted to disgrace the other. The attacks of both Koreas 
have been so intensive that the competitive arena encompasses 
the world, ranging from the United Nations and Africa to Latin 
America. Moreover, the division of Korea has greatly reduced the 
political autonomy for both South Korea and North Korea. 
Reunification will eliminate the unnecessary and unseemly efforts 
of each to disgrace the other. The end of intra-Korean rivalry will 
make the beginning of a newly established political autonomy, 
and Korea's participation in the affairs of the international 
community will be more meaningful and constructive. The role of 
Korea will become more active and more positive, as it should be, 
in the international political community. The foregoing implica-
tions are reason enough to venture into a speculation about a 
possibility of Korean reunification. 
While externally, or internationally it has become an acute 
political problem, the reunification of Korea is something that 
every Korean in both South and North Korea dreams of. Because 
Korea was a unified nation-state for a milenium, many Koreans 
strongly feel that the division is intolerably against Korean 
spiritual nature. Thus the issue of reunification is able to generate 
an extraordinary degree of support as a political symbol. Many 
Koreans realize that it is presently unrealistic and a remote 
possibility to envision a unified Korea. Nonetheless, they do 
dream of it and naturally speculate about such a possibility. 
Frequently, frustration drives Koreans to strongly demand from 
their politicians the creation of conditions conducive to such a 
possibility. Naturally, politicians find reunification a useful issue 
to be exploited for their own political causes. It is not only a useful 
issue to be exploited, but it is also an issue which often forced 
4. Jun-yop Kim, "The Significance and Problems of Korean Unification," The 
Journal of Asiatic Studies (December, 1970), p. 2. 
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governmental leaders to take a position. Thus various incidents 
reported in the news media around the DMZ or some policy 
statements in South and North Korea are partly a result of both 
Koreas' tactics on how to achieve the unification. Both Koreas' 
diplomatic offenses toward other countries is also invariably 
related with its overall strategy toward ultimate unification of 
Korea. In this respect, both North and South Korean governments 
have taken various policy positions on the unification. 
Thus, understanding of unification politics is indeed essential 
for an overall comprehension of Korean political behavior. This 
study will attempt to investigate historical patterns of the 
strategy and policy of unification, and to illuminate major factors 
contributing to the strategy and policy. In examining the strategy 
and policy, this study will primarily utilize a descriptive and 
contextual analysis using mainly written documents. The time 
parameter of this study will be the period of 1948-1978 for North 
Korea, and the period of 1953-1978 for South Korea. It will, 
therefore, cover the policies of the first republic, the short-lived 
Second Republic, and the current government of the third republic 
for South Korea. The interpretation of various documents from 
Korea is largely based upon the deductive and inductive reasoning 
of the author. 
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PART I: NORTH KOREAN UNIFICATION STRATEGY 
1. Unification Strategy by War, 1948-1953 
A brief survey of North Korean politics reveals that the North 
Korean strategy of reunification has changed several times. The 
first was reunification by war. This was during the period from 
the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to 
the end of the Korean conflict. The division of Korea occurred 
after World War II when Russian forces occupied North Korea and 
the U.S. military authorities entered South Korea.5 Later a new 
constitution for North Korea was adopted by the Supreme People's 
Assembly on September 3, 1948, under the auspices of the Russian 
army. At the end of December, 1948, all Soviet forces were 
withdrawn from North Korea. One of the first policy positions of 
North Korea was presented at an organizational meeting of the 
People's democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland on 
June 28, 1949. North Korea proposed the following unification 
principles: 
1. The unification must be achieved by Koreans alone. 
2. The U.S. troops and the U.N. Commission on Korea must 
be withdrawn from Korea immediately. 
3. A national election should be held to elect members of a 
legislative organization. 
4. The election committee must be composed of representa-
tives from various political parties and social organiza-
tions of South and North Korea. 
5. The election committee will give necessary instructions to 
the present governments of South and North Korea for the 
preparation of the nationwide election. A committee to 
supervise withdrawal of foreign troops will be organized. 
This committee will also directly take over police power 
from the governments of South and North Korea. 
5. For a detailed cause of Korean division, see my work, "U.S. Policy in Korea 
Partition," Asian Profile (October, 1977). 
Also see Hak..Joon Kim, "The Origin and Evolution of the South-North 
Korean Division," Problems of Korean Unification (Occasional Publications) 
(Seoul, Korea: Research Center for Peace and Unification, 1976), pp. 9-66. 
6 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
6. The legislative body newly established by the national 
election will adopt a constitution for the Korean Republic, 
and organize a new governmental structure. The new 
government will take over powers from South and North 
Korean governments. 
7. The army of South and North Korea will be absorbed by 
the government of the new Korean Republic. But those 
South Korean forces which participated in the suppression 
movement of the partisans should be dismissed from the 
army.s 
On June 7, 1950, the Democratic Front again proposed a 
reunification plan: 
1. A general election shall be held throughout Korea on 
August 5-8, 1950, to establish a unified supreme legisla-
tive organ. 
2. The legislative assembly so elected shall convene on 
August 15, 1950, the fifth anniversary of Korea's libera-
tion, in Seoul. 
3. A conference of representatives from all political parties 
and social organizations throughout Korea shall be called 
on June 15-17, 1950, in either Haeju or Kaesong. 
The conference shall discuss and adopt decisions on the 
following matters: a) Various conditions necessary for the 
peaceful unification of the Fatherland, b) Procedures 
governing the holding of a general election for the 
Supreme Korean legislative organ, c) The establishment of 
a central election guidance committee which will guide the 
general election. 
4. The conference shall specifically exclude certain individu-
als such as Syngman Rhee, Yi Pom-sok, Kim Song-su, 
Shin Hung-u, Shin Song-mo, Cho Pyong-ok, Chae Song-
uk, and Yun Chi-yong. The U.N. Korea Commission shall 
not be allowed to interfere in the business of national 
unification. The Korean people must solve the question of 
national unification on our own without foreign interven-
tion. 
6. See Tongil Moonje Jean Jaryo Jip (Materials for Problems of Korean 
Unification Plans) (Seoul, Korea: Far Eastern Research Institute, 1972), p. 36. 
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5. During the duration of the conference and of the general 
election, the government authorities in the southern and 
northern sections shall be responsible for maintaining 
social order. 7 
These proposals of North Korea appear to be, at least 
superficially, very reasonable. The North Korean proposal 
included a few coherent elements in its plan. First, the reunifica-
tion must be achieved without foreign interference. It means that 
the principle of self-determination must be incorporated as the 
foremost important principle. Second, a nationwide general 
election on the basis of the popular will is the method selected to 
establish the national government. Third, the future government 
of unified Korea should be totally a new government. 
A careful investigation of this proposal will, however, easily 
detect a number of conditions which could not possibly be 
accepted by South Koreans. First, this proposal did not recognize 
the authority of the South Korean government. Second, it failed to 
recognize the U.N. authority which legitimized South Korean 
government. Third, it proposes to absorb the military establish-
ments of South and North Korea, except those who participated in 
the suppression of the partisans in South Korea. This practically 
excludes all of the South Korean soldiers. Fourth, it excludes 
certain individuals such as Syngman Rhee, Yi Pom-sok, Kim 
Song-su, and many others, comprising practically the entire 
spectrum of the leadership in South Korea. This proposal, 
therefore, was a very hostile message to the South Korean 
government. 
Furthermore, Kim II Sung in his message of 1950 almost 
declared war against South Korea by urging South Koreans to 
"launch more vigorously than ever the grand nationwide country-
saving struggle" against the Rhee regime. In order to do so, Kim 
urged the South Korean people to isolate Rhee and then to "arouse 
uprising of the people, destroy the regime from within and without 
. . . and incessantly support the guerrillas both morally and 
materially. "8 
While North Korea was proposing various plans for the 
reunification, Kim II Sung went to Moscow early in March, 1949, 
and signed an agreement on economic and cultural cooperation. 
7. Se Jin Kim, Korean Unification: Source Materials With an Introduction 
(Seoul, Korea: Research Center for Peace and Unification, 1976), pp. 41-42. 
8. Ibid., p. 41. 
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Furthermore, the Soviet Union secretly agreed to furnish North 
Korea with anns and equipment to build the North Korean army. 
North Korea subsequently received, in 1949-50, from the Soviet 
Union ten reconnaissance aircraft, one-hundred Russian T-34 and 
T-70 tanks and heavy artillery. By June 1950, the North Korean 
ground forces exceeded 135,000 men, including approximately 
77,838 in seven assault infantry divisions, 6,000 in the tank 
brigade, and 18,600 highly trained border constabulary. In early 
1950 Communist China added to this impressive force by 
repatriating about 12,000 experienced Korean veterans from the 
Chinese Communist Forces. With this capability, on January 26, 
1950, Choi Yong Kon, the Minister of National Defense, made a 
confident statement that North Korean forces were "ready for 
combat at all times to crush enemies of the unification and 
independence of the Fatherland."9 Therefore, it is quite safe to 
assume that North Korea completed its plan for the impending 
invasion of the South, and for the reunification by a massive 
military force. While this impressive preparation of North Korea 
was going on, the U.S. troops were completely withdrawn from 
Korea, and the famous Acheson doctrine was announced. 
2. Strategy of Peaceful Coexistence, 1954-1956 
The policy of unification by war totally failed due to the 
intervention of the U.N. forces under the leadership of the United 
States. During the three years of fighting millions of Koreans 
suffered and thousands of families were dislocated. The war 
resulted in more than a million South Korean deaths, yet North 
Korea still could not achieve the noble goal of reunification. This 
forced North Korea to enter the second stage of North Korean 
unification strategy which began when the Armistice Agreement 
was signed on July 27, 1953. 
The Armistice Agreement was signed with a stipulation that 
"the peaceful settlement of the Korean question" was to be 
arranged in the near future. The failure at Panmunjum to arrange 
a high-level political conference led to the Berlin Conference 
where on February 18, 1954, an agreement was again made to call 
the Geneva Conference for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful 
settlement of the Korean question.10 At this conference, Nam 11, 
9. Ibid., p. 40. 
10. For the full text of the communique issued at Berlin in February 18, 1954, 
see the U.S. State Department, Bulletin (March 1, 1954), pp. 317-318. 
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the North Korean delegate, proposed the following scheme of 
Korean unification: 
1. The government of the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea and the government of the Republic of Korea are 
urged: 
a) to hold general elections for a national assembly for 
the formation of a unified Korean government; 
b) to organize an all-Korean Commission, the members 
of the Committee to be selected by the Supreme People's 
Committee of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
and the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea 
respectively, and to include representatives of the largest 
democratic social organizations in South and North 
Korea; 
* * * 
d) in order to assist the economic reconstruction of 
Korea, which is the first important step for the creation of 
the conditions necessary for realizing the national 
unification of Korea and with a view to promoting the 
material well-being of the Korean people and to maintain-
ing and developing the culture of the people; the all-
Korean Commission should immediately take measures to 
establish and develop economic and cultural relations 
between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and 
the Republic of Korea. . . . 
2. The necessity should be recognized of the withdrawal of 
all foreign military forces from Korean territory within six 
months. 
3. The necessity should be recognized for all those countries 
most interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far 
East to guarantee the peaceful development of Korea 
11 
Throughout this conference the North Korean proposal clearly 
suggested conditions to be met. First, the U.N. could not be a 
competent body to supervise Korean unification. Second, the 
11. See U.S. State Department, The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 39-40. 
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organization to oversee the all-Korean election should be repre-
sented equally regardless of the population from both sides. Third, 
a veto power should be preserved. Fourth, perhaps most interest-
ingly, prior to a political settlement non-political problems such as 
economic, cultural and social concerns were to be settled first. 
North Korea made it quite clear that "the economic reconstruction 
of Korea" must be the first step rather than an immediate political 
unification. 
The Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea passed a 
resolution on October 10, 1954, which was quite similar to the 
version presented by Nam 11 at the Geneva Conference, except for 
a few minor procedures regarding how to achieve ·unification. 
Furthermore, the United Democratic Fatherland Front made a 
statement in its 18th Session on March 7, 1955, that the failure to 
establish negotiations between North and South Korea and the 
delay in reunification was essentially due to American imperial-
ism and to Syngman Rhee's clique. The Fatherland Front, 
however, opened a possibility for further negotiations by stating 
that, despite a denial by the U.S. imperialists and South Korean 
rulers to heed an appeal from the Supreme People's Assembly, the 
road to reopen direct negotiations between South and North Korea 
was not necessarily completely blocked. Then on August 15, 1955, 
Kim 11 Sung of North Korea made a five-point proposal: 
1. In order to guarantee a permanent peace in Korea, an 
international conference should be reopened. 
2. All foreign forces are to be withdrawn from Korea. 
3. A non-aggression treaty should be concluded between 
North Korea and South Korea. 
4. Armed forces should be limited within a range of one 
hundred-thousand men. 
5. A conference for the representatives of political parties 
and social organizations from both Koreas should be 
called.12 
On April 28, 1956, the Third Congress of the Korean Worker's 
party again adopted a declaration on peaceful unification which 
urged convening of an international conference for the solution of 
the Korean question. During this second stage of North Korean 
12. For full text, see Nodong Shinmun (August 16, 1955). 
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unification policy, several observations can be made. First, North 
Korea's policy was a conciliatory, or to some degree, an 
acquiescent one. Perhaps it was at least an attempt to avoid 
provoking confrontation with South Korea. Second, North Korea 
again urged the opening of an international conference to 
"guarantee a permanent peace" in Korea, which suggests that 
unification was not an immediately pressing matter. A peaceful 
status quo on the Korean peninsula was a rather urgent matter. 
To support this position, North Korea again proposed a "non-
aggression" treaty between North and South Korea. Third, North 
Korea again proposed the reduction of armed forces to a minimal 
level. This meant that North Korea wanted to create a conducive 
condition for the future unification, i.e., a peaceful condition. To 
support this, North Korea urged an immediate withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from Korea. All of these quite clearly characterized 
North Korean strategy, namely maintaining a peaceful coexist-
ence policy while delaying the reunification until the time was 
right. 
The question remains, why did North Korea take this 
position? North Korea's sudden policy shift from achieving a 
military victory to achieving peaceful unification was partly due 
to external pressure upon the North Korean government. Particu-
larly, pressures from the Soviet Union and Communist China 
with unexpected American intervention were important external 
influences affecting North Korean behavior. Kim II Sung, who 
was virtually unknown to most Koreans, was introduced to the 
public by the Russian military authorities as a nationalist hero at 
a citizen's rally in Pyongyang on October 3, 1945.13 At that time, 
the very existence of Kim's regime was based on the Soviet 
Union's presence. Even the preparation of the Korean War was 
supported by the Soviet Union. According to a study done by 
Kiwon Chung before the war, the allocation of Russian mili-
tary advisers to North Korea's army was thought to have been 
as many as 150 per division. Furthermore, it is assumed that at 
least ten thousand men, mostly youths recruited by selective 
conscription, were sent to Siberia mainly for military and 
technical training in Khabarovsk and the Chita Far Eastern 
Military Academy.14 While the Russians helped to build North 
13. The State Department, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of 
Take-Over (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 39-40. 
14. Kiwon Chung, ''The North Korean People's Army and the Party," North 
Korea Today, edited by Robert Scalapino (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 
pp. 107-110. 
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Korean military capability, the U.S. announced the famous 
Acheson Line in January, 1950. The Acheson Line defined the 
American Pacific security line within the perimeter created by 
Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. This statement encouraged 
Stalin to believe that the Line excluded Korea. With this 
opportunity, the Soviet Union "ordered its Communist satellite to 
attack."15 American intervention, however, led to the highly 
unfavorable result of the Korean War. Stalin, furthermore, did not 
want to become involved in a direct confrontation with the United 
States. In this respect, the Soviet Union suggested as early as 
June, 1951, that an armistice could be arranged in Korea without 
the settlement of outstanding political issues. 
Kim Il Sung, therefore, was constantly under mounting 
pressures from the Soviet Union. Ulam even stated that the 
crucial decision concerning the conclusion of the armistice of 1953 
was made by the Soviet Union and reflected Russian interests.16 
The sudden death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, left the Soviet Union 
temporarily without a leader. In this situation, it might be that 
there was considerable uncertainty in defining the general line 
of Soviet foreign policy. Furthermore, it seems clear that no 
member of the collective leadership could advocate an adventu-
rous foreign policy before his political position had been 
consolidated at home. It seems reasonable to conclude that the 
Soviet Union would certainly press North Korea not to develop 
further trouble. Molotov's proposal, in the Geneva Conference, 
requesting "withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea" was an 
oblique attempt to avoid any further direct confrontation between 
Communist China and the United States. 
Communist China is also to be considered a source influenc-
ing North Korea's behavior. The relationship between North 
Korea and Communist China was a close one. As the fortunes of 
war changed drastically for South Korea and her allies, the 
Chinese warned that they would intervene if the U.N. forces 
crossed the 38th Parallel and pushed toward the Chinese border. 
Furthermore, Communist China's intervention in October, 1950 
enhanced China's influence on North Korean policy, for it 
practically saved North Korea from total defeat. Although 
Communist China feared the control of the strategic Korean 
peninsula by unfriendly military forces, it appears that China was 
15. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion & Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign 
Policy: 1917-67 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 525. 
16. Ibid., p. 533. 
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very reluctant to continue a head-on collision with the United 
States and that after twenty years of continuous civil and foreign 
wars China probably would have had difficulty waging war 
against the United States. Moreover, Truman's and Eisenhower's 
threats regarding the possibility of nuclear attack17 were ob-
viously perceived by and affected the decision of the Chinese 
leadership. As pointed out by Harold Hinton, the American 
hydrogen bomb test also helped to remind the Communists of the 
military odds facing them.1s Furthermore, Peking's peaceful 
coexistence strategy was extensively launched with the Bandung 
Conference of 1955. Therefore, Peking's efforts to avoid more 
military conflict with the U.S. and China's positive involvement 
in establishing improved relationships with a strategy of peaceful 
coexistence policy were well-reflected in North Korea's policy of 
favoring the status quo. 
North Korea's policy of favoring the status quo was also 
influenced by domestic factors. The instability of North Korean 
leadership within the Korean Worker's Party was a particularly 
important factor affecting the policy of status quo. The major 
cause of instability was attributable to factional conflict 
within the party. North Korea has had a long history of factional 
struggles which very often changed the direction of public 
policies. The 1954-56 period can be characterized in terms of a 
high degree of conflict politics among four factions: the Soviet 
faction, the Y enan faction, the domestic faction, and the 
immediate associates of Kim Il Sung known as the Kapsan 
faction. 19 
Kim II Sung was constantly challenged over the leadership 
position by various factions until 1956. One of the factions which 
threatened Kim's leadership in this period was Ho Kai-1 and his 
Soviet faction. Ho was confirmed as the second in authority as 
early as January, 1951 in the North Korean power structure.20 
17. According to David Rees, the death of Stalin and the threat by the U.S. to 
carry an atomic war to the Chinese mainland brought an end to the Korean War. 
See David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 
404-406. 
18. See Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Boston: 
Houghton-Mifflin, 1966), pp. 209-229. 
19. See Chong-sik Lee and Ki-wan, Ho "North Korea's Russian Faction," 
Asian Survey (April, 1968). Also for an excellent survey of unification strategy and 
the factional problem, see Sun Sung Cho, "Politics of North Korea's Unification 
Policies: 195Q-1965," World Politics (January 1967), pp. 218-241. 
20. Loc. cit., p. 276. 
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According to a former high ranking official in North Korea, Yi 
Chull Choo, the Soviet Union ordered Ho to be installed in that 
position so that in the event something happened in North Korea, 
the Russians could control the KWP through him. 21 As a chief of 
the Organization Bureau of the KWP, Ho had become a political 
threat to Kim II Sung. Kim barely managed to replace him in 
1953. Then Kim was challenged by the domestic faction man 
Pak Hon Y ong who had been very influential throughout the 
history of the Korean Communist movement. During 1953-55, 
Kim II Sung managed to eliminate the domestic faction and Pak 
as rivals. A more elaborate factional conflict was illustrated at the 
Third Party Congress held in April, 1956. At this congress 
prominent leaders of the Soviet faction and the Y enan faction 
directly engaged in attacking Kim II Sung's leadership. This 
conflict also ended in favor of Kim's Kapsan faction. As a result, 
the Soviet and Yen an factions were almost completely 
excluded from the Central Committee of the KWP. Kim barely 
survived the Third Party Congress, and it proved to be one of the 
most serious challenges to his leadership. 
While engaged in factional conflicts, Kim had to rebuild his 
country destroyed by the war. Kim particularly preferred to 
develop heavy industry as a means of establishing a solid base for 
the future revolutionary movement toward reunification. In this 
respect, Kim introduced in 1954 a three-year plan which placed the 
greatest emphasis on the development of heavy industry. 
Furthermore, Kim II Sung wanted to continue this policy in the 
next Five-Year Economic Plan to lay the foundation for an 
independent, self-supporting national economy. Facing these 
external and internal problems, Kim's policy of "coexistence" or of 
maintaining the status quo was a logical choice to follow. 
3. Peaceful Unification Strategy, 1957-1960 
The third stage of North Korea's unification policy was 
marshalled in during 1957. In this stage, North Korea launched 
two campaigns of reunification, namely, unification under the 
well-known Kim's Chuche thought and a strategy of peaceful 
unification. Kim II Sung proposed in a speech delivered at the 
North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly on September 20, 1957 
that: 
21. Yi Chull Choo, "Chosun Nodong Tang" (Korean Worker's Party), Sin Dong 
A (May, 1965), pp. 268-269. 
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1. It is imperative that all the foreign troops be withdrawn 
from Korea, and both of Korea's military forces be reduced 
to 100,000 in number. 
2. In order to provide a peaceful settlement for the Korean 
problem, an international conference of concerned nations 
should be called immediately. 
3. A national election should be held on the basis of equality, 
and direct secret balloting.22 
Then North Korea again proposed in February, 1958 the following 
points: 
1. The simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
both Koreas. 
2. The holding of all Korean free elections under "the 
supervision of neutral nations." 
3. The opening of negotiations for economic and cultural 
contacts between North and South Korea. 
4. The reciprocal reduction of armed forces to a bare 
minimum. North Korea has already reduced its army by 
80,000 men.23 
North Korea's peaceful unification policy was further elabo-
rated in a speech delivered by then Vice Premier Nam II at the 
Sixth Meeting, Second Term, of the Supreme People's Assembly 
held on October 26, 1959. Nam II proposed that: 
1. All of the foreign troops must be withdrawn. 
2. Military forces of both sides should be reduced to less than 
100,000 men within a short period. 
3. North and South Korea should simultaneously declare 
that military forces must never be used against each 
other. 
4. Mter the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops, an all-
Korean free election should be held. 
22. Korean National Assembly, Tongil Baeksu (White Paper on the Unifica-
tion) (Seoul, Korea: Library of the National Assembly, 1971), pp. 208-209. 
23. Nodong Shinmum (February 20, 1958). 
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5. A standing committee composed of representatives from 
national assemblies, governments, political parties, and 
social organizations of the South and North should be 
organized in order to discuss the matters of reunification, 
including the free election. 
6. Residents of South and North Korea be permitted to visit 
freely wherever they wish to go and to send mail. 24 
Kim 11 Sung proposed a drastic plan for reunification in a speech 
commemorating the fifteenth anniversay of Korean Liberation of 
August 14, 1960. He stated that: 
Although we consider the unification by a national election 
without foreign intervention as a most realistic and rational 
way for the peaceful reunification of the Fatherland and, . . . 
if the national election cannot be acceptable to the South 
Korean authority . . . we propose a confederation scheme to 
meet the problem.2s 
This was a scheme to create a loose confederation of the fully 
autonomous North and South Korean governments on a provi-
sional basis. Kim furthermore suggested that "if South Korean 
authority cannot accept the confederation proposal, then we 
propose a purely economic committee composed of representatives 
from various industries to cooperate for a mutual trade and 
economic reconstruction."26 Choi Yong Kun, then President ofthe 
Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly made a report at the 
Eighth Session of the Second Supreme People's Assembly on 
November 19, 1960. According to the report, Kim 11 Sung's new 
proposals were accepted as a "very realistic and reasonable 
program based on the correct analysis of the current internal and 
external situation."27 It then proposed and repeated a number of 
points: 
24. Tongil Munje Jean Jaryo Jip (Materials on the Unification Questions) 
(Seoul, Korea: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 1972), p. 40. 
25. Kim II Sung, Kim Il Sung Sunjip (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung) 
(Pyongyang: Chosun Nodongdang Chulpanbu, 1966), pp. 395-396. 
26. Ibid., p. 397. 
27. Documents on the Eighth Session of the Second Supreme People's 
Assembly of the D.P.R.K. (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1960), p. 8. 
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1. The question of unifying Korea must be settled without 
fail by peaceful means, and independently by the Korean 
people themselves. 
2. The proposed confederation is to be enforced by way of 
setting up the Supreme National Committee ... while 
retaining the present political systems. 
3. For this, the technical forces of North and South Korea 
should be mobilized to survey the reclaimable land and 
carry on designing work. 
* * * 
5. We are always ready to receive any South Korean 
unemployed who want to work in the northern part. 
* * * 
10. This first step toward fulfilling the solemn national task 
confronting us is to open negotiation between the North 
and South at an early date.2B 
Throughout the study of the policy proposals of North Korea 
in this stage there are several characteristics to be detected. First, 
North Korea would still not accept the legitimacy of the U.N. as a 
supervising body of all-Korean elections for the reunification. 
Instead, it suggested the "holding of an all-Korean election" under 
the "supervision of neutral nations." North Korea also called for 
an international conference of "concerned nations" to provide a 
peaceful settlement for the Korean problem. Second, North Korea 
repeatedly proposed a mutual reduction of military forces of both 
sides. It also repeatedly called for an immediate withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from the Korean peninsula. Third, North Korea 
proposed a "mutual renunciation of military means" to unify the 
country. In order to achieve this peaceful unification, it offered to 
execute a non-aggression treaty between South and North Korea. 
Finally, in this stage North Korea proposed the well-publicized 
confederation scheme. The consistent theme in this period of 
North Korean strategy was the peaceful unification of Korea. 
There were several factors affecting the change in policy of 
North Korea. First, it was related to the North Korean political 
leadership structure. As already discussed, Kim and his followers 
28. Ibid., pp. 17-62. 
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faced strong resistance from opposing factions and adroitly 
managed to survive in power during the 1956 Third Party 
Congress. Since then Kim's leadership had gradually reorganized 
the party leadership structure. By 1958 Kim and his Kapsan 
faction had become much stronger. A massive purge of the Army 
in 1958 ensured consolidation of the control of the Kapsan faction 
over the military recruits and command. 29 The remaining Soviet 
and Y enan faction members had completely been removed from 
the party with the exception of a few who cooperated with Kim 11 
Sung in expelling their fellows. Kim and the Kapsan faction, 
therefore, enjoyed a high degree of stability in the party. This 
stability of the internal structure left a considerable amount of 
room within which Kim could maneuver his external policy. 
Second, in the economic sector North Korea achieved a 
remarkable success during this period. North Korea stated that 
the tasks of electrification and irrigation had been basically 
completed in this period. While some of the features of the 
communes might possibly have been retained, the kitchen plots, 
small hand tools, chickens, pigs, rabbits and other animals were 
returned to private hands. Thus a report from North Korea stated 
that the farmer and his family increased their private production 
of livestock and vegetables so that they could sell them on the 
farmer's market and earn enough money to build a new house. 
Furthermore, in this period, the leading position of the state-
operated farms had begun to play an important role in the 
development of agricultural production.30 In this regard North 
Korean leadership perceived a certain level of modernization in 
North Korea. 
Third, Communist Chinese troops which had become a great 
economic burden were completely withdrawn from North Korea in 
1958. More important to the Kapsan faction, however, was the 
political burden. As long as Chinese forces were stationed in 
North Korea, Kim's leadership was vulnerable, particularly to 
attacks by the Y enan faction. In this regard, the term "withdra-
wal of all foreign forces" might well have been directed overtly 
toward the United States, and covertly toward the Chinese 
Communists. In this effort Kim negotiated with the Soviet Union. 
29. Pukhan Chonggam (General Survey of North Korea) (Seoul, Korea: The 
Research Institute of the Communist Block, 1968), p. 193. 
30. Chong·sik Lee, ''The Socialist Revolution in the North Korean Country· 
side," Asian Survey (October, 1962), pp. 21-22. 
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After prolonged negotiations, a Sino-Korean Joint Communique 
was signed on February 19, 1958 indicating Chinese willingness 
to complete the evacuation by the end of 1958.31 After the 
withdrawal North Korea became less susceptable to Chinese 
influence in North Korea. In this sense all of the internal 
reconstruction of economic, military and political strength, plus 
the withdrawal made Kim II Sung a confident leader. Kim II 
Sung's major report to the Fourth Congress reflected "the newly 
found confidence of a man who completely smashed internal 
dissension and succeeded in pushing his people through years of 
bitter sacrifices on behalf of state development with a substantial 
degree of success."32 
Fourth, another factor was related to situations in South 
Korea. Social discontent reached its height in this period in South 
Korea. The annual growth of per capita real income from 1956 
was less than two percent.33 The rapid increase of population, 
however, virtually nullified all sectors of economic growth. The 
financial disequilibrium of the South Korean Government 
exacerbated the situation of chronic underemployment and 
poverty. Police brutality, rigging elections for public offices and 
political corruption were widespread under Rhee's Government. 
Dissatisfaction against Rhee's regime was tremendous in city 
areas. Political corruption and police interference with civilian life 
led to widespread desertions by intellectual groups from South 
Korean society. As the Government increased its repression of 
civil liberties, the ill will of the people toward the Government also 
increased. The Government went so far as to order a popular 
newspaper, Kyunghyang Shinmun, to close its doors. This was 
indeed a shocking move to the Korean public. 
Furthermore, while conflict between the ruling party and the 
opposition was at a high point the newly emerged progressive 
party (Jinbo Dang) was gaining the attention of the public. This 
party openly advocated a peaceful reunification of the country 
and publicly denounced the attitude of the Liberal Party toward 
North Korea. One thing to note is that the leader of the 
Progressive Party, Cho Bong Am, was an arch-rival of Rhee in the 
1956 presidential election and won almost 2.2 million votes. Cho 
31. Peking Review (March 1, 1958), pp. 21-23. 
32. R. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, Communism in Korea Part 1: The 
Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 566. 
33. See the Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook (Seoul, Korea: The 
Bank of Korea, 1967), pp. 12-29. 
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Bong Am, however, was eventually arrested and sentenced by the 
court to death, and the Progressive Party was outlawed. 
Then the April student uprising toppled the Rhee regime. The 
April uprising was apparently as much a surprise to the 
Communists as it was to the Government of the Republic of 
Korea. According to Pak Dong Un the uprising had never been 
considered in the North Korean tactical plan toward South 
Korea.34 This uprising provided an opportunity for North Korea to 
advance the theme of peaceful unification. North Korea hailed 
and appealed to the students to rebel, to become "anti-
government," and to be "anti-American." Even though North 
Korea had wished to promote social disorder in the South, the 
Communists did not commit acts of individual terror. This 
avoidance of violent tactics was largely due to North Korea's 
perception that "since the symbols of Communism and bloodshed 
are fused with horror in popular attitudes as a result of the 
wartime experience, it would have been suicidal to have raised the 
blood-red banner of Communist insurrection on the streets of 
Seoul in the spring of 1960."35 
The Chang Myon Government replaced Hehr Chung's interim 
government. Social chaos and political instability continued in 
South Korea. It appeared that North Korea might have a chance 
to take advantage of the situation through tactical violence. It 
must have been well perceived by the North Korean leadership, 
however, that only a few leftist-oriented persons managed to get 
elected to the National Assembly. Thus as conservative and anti-
Communist trends were still strongly held in South Korea, it 
appeared that Kim's leadership attempted to alleviate fears on the 
part of the South Korean Government that the entire nation would 
fall under Communist control. This was the situation when Kim II 
Sung proposed "the confederated unification" scheme rather than 
a direct appeal to those elements favoring Communism or leftist 
ideology. The scheme was an effort to demonstrate to the rightist 
or conservative sectors that -Kim's North Korea would recognize 
any existing elements in South Korea. 
34. Pak Dong Un, "Buhkan Eui Jajoo Rosun Khwa Tongil Jungchaek (North 
Korea's Independent Line and Unification Policy)," The Journal of Asiatic Studies 
(March, 1968), p. 9. 
35. Glenn D. Page, "Korea," Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Use 
of Political Violence, edited by C. E. Black and T. P. Thorton (Princeton: 
University Press, 1964), pp. 233-234. 
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While alleviating South Korean fears toward North Korea by 
recognizing the legitimacy of the South Korean Government's 
existence, North Korea launched a multi-stage tactical offensive. 
The first stage continued psychological warfare by promoting a 
widespread peace offensive in South Korea. Second, there was a 
reconstruction of the underground cell organization which was 
completely exposed and destroyed during the war. Third, there 
was an attempt to elect Communists to National Assembly seats 
by collaborating with various leftist groups in South Korea.36 The 
peaceful unification by confederation in this regard, was a highly 
convincing tactic. The fourth stage was an attempt to manipulate 
an end to the American presence by forging a combined front of 
top level government officials, students and the intellectual 
community. Thus, the situations which occurred during this 
period in South Korea became an important factor in the strategy 
of North Korea in this stage. 
4. Unification Strategy by a People,s Democratic 
Revolution, 1961-1965 
The fourth stage of North Korean unification strategy began 
in 1961. During this stage North Korea gradually transformed its 
unification strategy. North Korea reacted to the military coup in 
South Korea with apprehension. A short while after the coup, 
however, North Korean Vice-Premier Kim II reported the North 
Korean unification policy posture at the 16th commemoration of 
the liberation from Japan on August 14, 1961. The following 
points were proposed: 
1. It is our persistent and unchangeable principle that a 
peaceful unification of the fatherland can only be 
achieved by Koreans themselves on the basis of free and 
democratic principles through an all-Korean election 
without foreign intervention. 
2. In order to achieve a peaceful unification, the first step 
will be a free and open-minded negotiation between our 
peoples. 
3. We will always cooperate and work hand in hand with 
anyone, without questioning his religious and political 
beliefs, if he wishes to work for the cause of peaceful 
unification. 
36. Pak Dong Un, loc. cit., p. 10. 
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4. The only way to rehabilitate the economy and to solve the 
poverty in South Korea is to establish a channel for 
trading between the South and the North, so that South 
Korea can benefit from the strong economy of the North.a7 
The Third Session of the Third Supreme People's Assembly in 
March, 1964, adopted a resolution appealing to the South Korean 
National Assembly and to various social organizations. Accord-
ing to the resolution: 
1. We urge an immediate end to the currently progressing 
Japanese-South Korean talks. We then propose a North-
South conference to save the Fatherland by means of 
peaceful and independent reunification. 
2. We urge the immediate overthrow of the traitorous Park 
Chung Hee Government. 
• • • 
5. We urge that the chronic poverty of the South Korean 
economy be solved not by a reliance on foreign aid, but by 
a realization of a free self-reliance through South-North 
economic cooperation so that the national capacity can be 
fully mobilized. In this regard, we offer South-North 
economic cooperation. 
6. We will accept unemployed South Koreans, and provide 
for them functionally suitable jobs and security.38 
On January 8, 1965, Kim 11 Sung laid down a unification 
policy in a letter replying to the President of the Korean Affairs 
Institute in the United States. Kim made the following points: 
1. The North and South Korean authorities conclude a peace 
agreement pledging not to resort to armed attack against 
each other. 
2. We will join hands with anyone at any time if he defends 
the interest of the national and aspires to the country's 
unification irrespective of his political views and ideology 
and of his past actions. 
37. Chokuk Tongil (August 14, 1961). 
38. Chosun Chungang Yongam: 1965 (Korea Year Book), p. 111. 
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3. To achieve the reunification of the country, we should pool 
the strength of the entire Korean people in North and 
South and fight against the foreign imperialist aggressive 
forces and their allies - the traitors, reactionary bureau-
crats, political quacks and impostors who are hindering 
reunification. 
4. If all the patriotic forces of North and South Korea unite, 
we will definitely open the road to contact and negotiation 
between the North and the South, realize mutual coopera-
tion and exchange, force the U.S. Army to withdraw, and 
achieve the reunification of the country. 
5. Without unity and struggle we can neither drive out the 
U.S. aggressor army nor achieve national reunification.a9 
Throughout the analysis of North Korean policy in this stage 
there are a few things which can be observed. First, there are a 
number of elements that North Korea reiterated in prior policy 
directions such as unification without foreign-intervention and 
economic interchange with the Seoul Government. The proposals 
of confederation and a peaceful reunification were also repeated. 
North Korea also repeatedly urged a peace agreement between 
North and South Korea. 
Second, there are, however, a number of gradual policy shifts 
in this stage which can be detected. One shift was the extremely 
hostile attitude toward Park's Government in the South. North 
Korea made it clear that Park's Government must be overthrown. 
This was quite contrary to the previously expressed attitude that 
the North would negotiate with anyone for the purpose of 
achieving reunification. 
Third, probably the most distinctive characteristic of the 
policy in this stage was the strategy of reunification by "the 
people's democratic revolution," particularly, in South Korea. This 
strategy was an attempt on one hand to avoid a massive direct 
confrontation, namely war, between North and South Korea, and 
on the other hand to create a conducive condition for a revolution 
in South Korea, which would eventually overthrow the existing 
government. Then it would be merged with North Korea. This 
strategy was an attempt to exploit political and social discontents 
stemming from military rule and economic degradation in South 
39. Kim 11 Sung, For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea (New 
York: International Publishers, Inc., 1975), pp. 101-110. 
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Korea. In this respect, North Korea repeatedly appealed to South 
Koreans to remedy "the chronic poverty by a realization of a free 
self-reliance through South-North economic cooperation." Further-
more, North Korea called for a united fight against "the traitors, 
reactionary bureaucrats, political quacks and impostors who are 
hindering reunification." 
One of the factors influencing North Korea to adopt the 
strategy of "the people's democratic revolution" was the new 
situation which occurred in South Korea. North Korea reacted to 
the military coup in Seoul in a cautious manner. In the early 
period of the coup, North Korean broadcasts reportedly hailed the 
overthrow of the corrupt and puppet government of Chang Myon. 
It appears that North Korea believed the new situation in the 
South was beneficial to its interests. 40 It became apparent, 
however, that the military government was going to develop a 
strong anti-communist posture. As stated in the revolutionary 
pledges, anti-communism became the first national policy. Then, 
the Junta made sweeping arrests of leftist-oriented groups and 
individuals. All the vocal exponents of political negotiation with 
North Korea were banished. This made it difficult for the North to 
pursue its strategy of peaceful unification. 
This new situation indeed was an unwanted and unexpected 
tum of events for the North Korean leadership. Even Kim 11 Sung 
reportedly admitted the difficulty in pursuing further his peaceful 
unification strategy. Kim declared that "the South Korean people 
find themselves in the worst adversity in which the outrageous 
bayonet stifles everything, and the struggle of the masses for the 
country's peaceful unification and for existence is subjected to 
ruthless suppression."41 Furthermore, Kim confessed that due to 
"the absence of the political party of the working people, the 
South Korean people failed to collect the fruits of costly struggles 
in the past."42 Kim exhorted the South Koreans to establish their 
own communist party in order to carry out the revolution ahead. 
In this regard, while Kim was showing a conciliatory gesture to 
the South by stating that "the Korean people do not want a 
fratricidal war nor do they want to squander the precious fruits of 
40. This was Glenn Paige's view. North Korea possibly perceived a strong 
possibility of establishing an anti-American government in the South due to 
personal background of the coup leader, then Major General Pak Chung See Glenn 
D. Paige, "North Korea," loc. cit., pp. 234-235. 
41. Documents of the Fourth Congress of the Worker's Party of Korea 
{Pyongyang: Korean Worker's Party, 1961), p. 384. 
42. Ibid., p. 388. 
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their labor in a civil war,"43 he intended first to rebuild 
Communist forces in the South by exploiting the social and 
political discontents. The turmoil stemmed from the transition 
from military rule to civilian government, and from 
continuing social unrest. Thus the uncertain situation in South 
Korea became one of the factors involved in the strategy of "the 
people's democratic revolution." 
Another factor which can be attributed to the strategy 
stemmed from the increasing conflict between the Soviet Union 
and Communist China. In earlier years the Sino-Soviet conflict 
provided an opportunity for Kim to play client politics between the 
two giants. Furthermore, North Korea attempted to avoid 
becoming entangled in the conflict. Although Kim II Sung 
managed to stay neutral, both the increasing belligerency of the 
South Korean government and the Sino-Soviet rift brought a new 
element of uncertainty into Kim's perception of North Korea's 
relations with South Korea. Kim's concept of ultimate security 
was predicted on unity between the Soviet Union and Communist 
China.44 With this uncertainty, in order to guarantee its own 
safety, North Korea signed the Soviet-Korean treaty in Moscow on 
July 6, 1961. According to the treaty in the event that either 
contracting party was militarily attacked by another nation, the 
other party would, without delay, provide military and other 
assistance "with all means at its disposal."45 After the signing of 
the Soviet-Korean treaty, Kim II Sung flew to Peking where he 
signed the Sino-Korean treaty with Chou En-lai on July 11, 1961. 
Despite a strenuous effort on the part of North Korea to 
remain neutral, Kim II Sung was gradually forced to shift his 
position. There were a number of incidents which forced North 
Korea to change its neutrality. Once involved, for example, 
Yugoslavia and another had to deal with the Communist Chinese 
43. Rinn-Sup Shinn, "North Korean Policy Toward South Korea," Major 
Powers and Korea, edited by Young C. Kim (Silver Springs, Maryland: Research 
Institute of Korean Affairs, 1973), p. 91. 
44. Nodong Shinmun (July 7, 1961). 
45. According to Byung Chul Koh, the Soviet-American Confrontation in 
Cuba, measured in terms both of the number and scale of mass rallies waged in 
support of the Cuban people and of the space devoted to it in Nodong shinmun, 
received as much attention as the South Korean Student uprisings of April, 1960. 
See Byung Chul Koh, Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1967), pp. 65-66. 
46. Nodong Shinmun (November 6, 1962). 
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invasion of Indian territory. Adding to these situations, the 
Cuban missile crisis occurred. This crisis attracted a great deal of 
attention in North Korea.4s North Korea vigorously supported the 
Cuban people, declaring that "to crush the aggressive maneuvers 
of the U.S. imperialists" was "the sacred duty of the world 
proletariat and all peace-loving people alike."47 The Soviet 
capitulation, however, created a profound feeling of disappoint-
ment inside Communist China and North Korea. North Korea 
vehemently expressed the disappointment by accusing the Soviet 
Union of "beautifying imperialism - capitulation to imperialists, 
spreading illusions about imperialism, and maliciously plotting to 
disarm the masses before the imperialists. " 48 The Soviet Union 
eventually withdrew its economic aid from North Korea which 
remained without military and economic assistance from the 
Soviet Union until1965.49 Until the end of 1964 North Korea sided 
with China in the Sino-Soviet conflicts. 
The Sino-Soviet conflict and the Cuban crisis led Kim 11 Sung 
to reevaluate North Korea's policy posture. North Korea realized 
that there was no assurance it would in fact get massive support 
from both the Soviet Union and Communist China should it 
decide to engage in a major war for unification with South Korea. 
With regard to this uncertainty North Korean leadership adopted 
the policy of a "self-reliance defense" posture. This policy known 
as the four point military program was designed: (1) to transform 
every recruit into a model soldier; (2) to modernize North Korea's 
arms and equipment; (3) to arm the entire population; and (4) to 
transform the whole country into a vast impregnable fortress. 
Added to these considerations are a number of other 
factors such as the economic difficulty and the restructuring of 
North Korean political leadership. With these new situations 
North Korea realized that its strategy for peaceful unification was 
not workable. Even Kim 11 Sung confessed that anti-Communism 
was too deeply rooted in South Korea. He also realized that there 
was great uncertainty about the outcome of attempting to unify 
Korea by a massive war. In this regard, well perceiving the 
situation, Kim 11 Sung made plain that the South Korean 
revolutionary forces were still very weak. He then noted that even 
though the South Koreans could count on help from the North, 
47. Nodong Shinmun (December 17, 1962). 
48. Puckhan Chonggam, op. cit., pp. 374-376. 
49. See Kim II Sung Jujak Sunjip (Selected Works of Kim fl Sung), Vol. IV 
(Pyongyang: Inmin Chulpan Sa, 1969), pp. 53-54. 
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substantial struggles must be carried out by the South Koreans 
themselves in a spirit of self-help. Thus he stressed that the South 
Koreans must have their own party and wage a struggle 
according to their own strategic and tactical thinking.50 Further-
more, in order to unify the country by mass revolution, Kim Il 
Sung ordered the following multi-staged tactics: (1) preserve and 
maintain revolutionary forces in South Korea; (2) rebuild the 
revolutionary party; (3) raise revolutionary consciousness among 
the people; (4) expand revolutionary strength; (5) build a "united 
front" of poor peasants, workers, and students and intellectuals; 
and (6) build a united front for anti-American efforts."51 Kim 
hoped with this strategy that when the time came for the mass 
revolution in South Korea, South Korea would be unified again. 
5. Unification by Vietnamization, 1966-1976 
The fifth stage of transformation of the unification strategy 
was gradually occurring in the early months of 1966. In this stage, 
the strategy can be characterized in terms of the "unification by 
Vietnamization" of South Korea. This strategy persisted up to 
1976. Kim Kwang Hyop, then the Vice-Premier of North Korea 
proposed the following points in his speech of September 8, 1966: 
1. The United Nations must stop any further discussion on 
Korea, and cancel all of the resolutions adopted by the 
organization. 
2. All foreign troops including the U.N. forces should be 
withdrawn immediately from Korea. 
3. Dissolve the UNCURK. 
4. A South-North joint conference for political parties and 
social organization should be held to discuss the question 
of Korean reunification. 
5. An international conference of "the concerned nations" 
must be called for a peaceful coordination of Korean 
questions.52 
50. See Kim 11 Sung Sunjip (Selected Writings of Kim ll Sung) (Pyongyang: 
Tongbang Sa, 1965), pp. 594-598. 
51. See Nodong Shinmun (September 8, 1966). 
52. Kim 11 Sung, Let Us Embody More Thoroughly the Revolutionary Spirit of 
Independence, Self-Sustenance and Self-Defense in All Fields of State Activity 
(New York: New World Liberation Front, 1970), p. 14. 
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This proposal was merely a reiteration of previous positions. 
Kim 11 Sung made a statement again on December 16, 1967: 
We regard whatever attempt to realize the country's unifica-
tion by relying on foreign forces as a treachery to the country 
and the nation to place the whole of Korea in the hands of 
foreign aggressors. The question of Korean unification is an 
internal affair of the Korea people, ... We hold invariably 
that the question of unifying our fatherland must be settled 
by our people themselves without interference from outside 
forces after the aggressive army of U.S. imperialism is 
withdrawn from South Korea.53 
This statement is again a repetition of the position that Korean 
unification must be achieved by Koreans alone. In order to 
accomplish that U.S. forces must withdraw from South Korea. 
North Korea repeatedly urged similar positions through 
various channels of communication such as the United Nations, 
conferences at Panmunjom, and others. Then North Korean 
Foreign Minister, Ho Dam, offered an Eight Point proposal for the 
unification at the Supreme People's Congress on April 12, 1971: 
1. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. 
2. Reduce military forces of both South and North Korea to 
less than 100,000 numbers. 
3. Abandon .or declare to nullify South Korea's mutual 
defense treaty with U.S. and the treaty with Japan. 
4. Establish a unified central government through a free all-
Korean election. 
5. Immediate release of all the political prisoners, and 
guarantee freedom for all the political activities in South 
Korea. 
6. Establish a confederate government as a temporary 
expediency. 
7. Mutual exchange of delegates for various non-political 
activities; i.e., sports, art, culture, education, economic 
trade. And, in addition, allow mail exchange. 
53. Nodong Shinmun (April 13, 1971). 
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8. In order to discuss the procedural matter to achieve the 
goals, call for a North-South Koreans' political conference 
composed of representatives from various political parties 
and social organizations. 54 
Then a surprising development occurred when a joint 
communique, signed by Y ong Chu Kim, Director of the Organization 
Bureau of the Korean Worker's Party, was announced in early 
1972. According to the communique, there were seven points of 
agreement reached between North and South Korea: (1) reunifica-
tion must be based on three principles, independence from and 
non-interference by outside forces, peaceful means to achieve 
unification, and acknowledgement that national unity trans-
cended ideological and system differences; (2) disavowal of 
propaganda or armed provocations against each other; (3) 
various exchanges in many fields; (4) support for the Red Cross 
talks; (5) establishment of a direct telephone line between Seoul 
and Pyongyang; (6) establishment of a South North Coordinating 
Committee; and (7) a solemn pledge to carry out the agreement 
faithfully. 55 Unfortunately, and contrary to the great expectations 
of the Korean people which stemmed from the surprise announce-
ment, the political talks between South and North Korea were 
eventually deadlocked. ss 
While a stalemate of the meetings of the Committee persisted, 
North Korean maneuvers for unification were continuing. Kim II 
Sung made a speech in Pyongyang on June 23, 1973 regarding 
Korean unification. He made the following suggestions: 
1. Remove the state of military confrontation and ease 
tension between the North and the South. 
2. Realize many-sided collaboration and interchange be-
tween the North and the South in all the political, 
military, diplomatic, economic and cultural fields. 
3. Invite the broad sections of people of all strata in the 
North and the South to participate in the nation-wide 
patriotic work for national reunification. 
54. Hankuk Ilbo (July 4, 1972). 
55. For an analytical view of the committee, see Dong-Bok Lee, "The South-
North Coordinating Committee of Korea: An Analytical Review," Problems of 
Korean Unification, edited by Se-Jin Kim (Seoul: Research Center For Peace and 
Unification, 1976), pp. 152-166. Also see Se-Jin Kim, op. cit., pp. 63-79. 
56. See Journal of Korean Affairs (October, 1973), pp. 52-54. 
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4. Institute a North-South confederation under the single 
name of the state. 
5. The North and the South should advance jointly in the 
field of foreign relations. 57 
North Korean Foreign Minister, Ho Dam, offered the following 
unification plan at the Fifth Supreme People's Assembly on 
March 22, 1974: 
1. Both sides shall pledge to each other not to invade the 
other side. 
2. The two sides shall discontinue arms reinforcement. 
3. The foreign troops should be withdrawn at the earliest 
possible date. 
-4. Korea shall not be made a military base of any foreign 
country.58 
An analysis of the unification policy position from 1966 to 
1976 evidences, at least on the surface, that North Korea had 
pursued a position similar to that of previous periods. It 
repeatedly offered a measure of peaceful unification. It also · 
demanded an immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. 
North Korea continuously proposed the confederation scheme. It 
also offered the mutual exchange of various fields in order to 
create a conducive condition for the eventual unification. A 
careful analysis of North Korean behavior, however, reveals a 
remarkable departure in a number of aspects from previous 
periods of unification strategy. First, North Korean hostility 
toward the South was increasingly virulent. There were increased 
North Korean violations in the DMZ. The number of North 
Korean provocations in the DMZ in 1967 was reported to be ten 
times that reported in the previous year. In that year, there were 
423 major incidents and 117 minor incidents involving North 
Korean intruders in the DMZ.59 The North Korean violations of 
the armistice, furthermore, drastically increased up to 1975.60 
57. The Pyongyang Times (March 30, 1974). 
58. See SNin Kim, op. cit., p. 61. 
59. See Bae-Ho Hahn, Sang-woo Lee, and Sag-Yong Choi, Hanlwok, Mikook, 
flbon (Korea, U.S., Japan) (Seoul, Korea: Asian Institute for Public Policy, 1977), 
pp. 12Q-122. Particularly see Professor Lee's study on page 121. 
60. For an account of all these incidents, see Donga flbo (June 24, 1970). 
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Second, North Korea attempted massive infiltration into South 
Korea. North Korea sent large numbers of secret agents and 
guerrilla units into South Korea. For example, in 1967 alone, there 
were 215 armed clashes between North Korean infiltrators and 
South Korean authorities. From the beginning of 1966, there were 
a number of major incidents reported in South Korean territory. 
North Korea killed four South Korean seamen, and kidnapped 
their ship on January 26, 1966. It also sank a South Korean naval 
ship and wounded forty crew members on January 19, 1967. Then, 
on January 21, 1968, the famous North Korean commando 
incident occurred in South Korea. A North Korean commando unit 
composed of 24 men came within a mile of the presdential 
mansion in Seoul with the mission of assassinating South Korean 
President Chung Hee Park. After a violent armed clash with the 
South Korean authorities, twenty-one of the commandos were 
killed, one was captured, and two fled to the North. Furthermore, 
in the same month, North Korea kidnapped the U.S.S. Pueblo and 
its crew. On September 17, 1969, North Korean infiltrators again 
killed seven South Korean including two policemen and five 
civilians near a small island called Wando. On December 11th of 
the same year, a South Korean airline jet was hijacked to the 
North. A South Korean naval communication ship and its entire 
crew were forced to sail to North Korea on June 5, 1970.61 Those 
are merely a few examples of North Korean attempts to infiltrate 
South Korea. This type of North Korean tactical infiltration 
continued, while the North-South Korean talks were being held. 
One of the most dramatic incidents occurred on March 19, 1975. 
On that day, the U.N. Command in South Korea revealed that a 
second underground tunnel had been constructed by North Korea. 
According to military sources in South Korea, not only motor 
vehicles but also certain types of field-artillery weapons could 
have passed through this tunnel. The tunnel was apparently 
intended for a large-scale infiltration of North Korean manpower 
into the South. 
Third, North Korea apparently attempted to rebuild en masse 
the underground organization in South Korea. North Korean 
leaders perceived, in particular, that the underground organiza-
tion had to find a way to participate legitimately in the South 
61. In this dimension, see an excellent survey of Korean politics, Gregory 
Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1968). 
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Korean political process. By doing so, North Korea could cultivate 
the elements of the anti-government movements in the South. In 
this regard, North Korea invested a great deal of money which 
was smuggled into the South, and eventually rerouted into a 
legitimate channel of political activity. One of the organizations 
which eventually surfaced was the famous Tonghyok Tang 
(Revolutarionary Unification Party). This was a front organiza-
tion of several underground groups. The Tonghyok Tang, 
however, was dismantled by the South Korean authorities in 1968. 
There had reportedly been a number of cases of North Korean 
attempts to infiltrate legitimate political activities in South Korea 
during this period. Fourth, while North Korea carried out various 
tactics already mentioned, it also accelerated a peace offensive 
abroad. It was an attempt to cultivate international opinions in 
favor of North Korean positions. The offensive had two major 
targets, one being the third world countries which could help the 
North in the U.N., and the other being the American public. As 
various data indicates, in this period North Korea expanded 
enormously its overseas missions, particularly in Africa and to a 
lesser extent in Latin America. Despite the financial burdens, the 
North Korean campaign to picture itself as a peace-loving country 
was very extensive throughout the world. Particularly, the 
campaign to influence the American public was rather extensive. 
North Korea purchased expensive full-page advertisements in 
prominent newspapers such as The New York Times and the 
Washington Post. 
Through a brief analysis, a few characteristics of North 
Korean unification strategies can be observed in this period. One 
characteristic can be called the "hit and run" strategy. This was 
an attempt to scare the South Korean public by utilizing various 
tactics, while simultaneously proposing peace initiatives. It was a 
strategy designed to create a psychological disorder in the South. 
Its aim was to create a public panic which would lead to the 
instability of the South Korean economic structure. This strategy, 
if successful, would also have had a discouraging impact on the 
investment of foreign capital in South Korea. North Korea clearly 
wanted to weaken the internal solidarity of South Korea. If this 
strategy succeeded, it would have been easy for North Korea to 
carry out guerrilla warfare, or possibly even limited strategic 
warfare. Another element of strategy was to cultivate interna-
tional opinion so that it could force the withdrawal of U.S. forces 
from the Korean peninsula. In this strategy North Korea also 
appealed to the American people by reminding them that it was 
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not in their interests for the U.S. government to make such a 
strong commitment to South Korea. It also reminded Americans 
that the U.S. government would have to negotiate directly with 
North Korea about problems concerning the division of the 
Korean Peninsula. North Korea was clearly sending a message to 
the United States that there was room for a negotiated settlement 
of Korean problems. All of these tactics remarkably resemble in 
many respects the successful unification efforts of the North 
Vietnamese. 
Why did North Korea develop such a multifaceted strategy to 
unify Korea? The first factor is related to South Korean economic 
development. As previously indicated, the economy had been 
always a troublesome problem to the South Korean government. 
Chronic underemployment and unemployment, continuing infla-
tion, sagging industrial outputs, and so forth had increased 
societal discontentment and further alienated the people from 
their government.62 This economic difficulty of South Korea 
provided a fertile climate for North Korean peaceful unification 
offenses. In fact, North Korea repeatedly made known that it 
would accept South Korean unemployed workers for employment 
in the North. Thus North Korea perceived that economic troubles 
might well be a factor to generate a revolution in South Korea. 
This economic situation, however, was drastically beginning 
to change. South Korean GNP grew at an average rate of about 10 
percent per annum between 1962 and 1976. Furthermore, despite 
the energy crisis, during the first two years of the Third Five-Year 
Plan (1972-76), the real growth of the GNP has averaged 11.6 
percent per annum. Even foreign exports increased from $54.8 
million in 1962 to $3,220.6 million in 1973.63 Because of new 
industrial outputs, unemployment also substantially declined. The 
increased export earnings also improved the South Korean 
balance of payments. Even rice and barley production had 
increased more than 50 percent, eventually making South Korea 
self-sufficient in these essential grains. Although, as pointed out 
by David Cole and Princeton Lyman, there were some "structural 
62. For an excellent brief introduction to South Korean economy, see Seung 
Hee Kim, "Economic Development of South Korea,: Korea: A Divided Nation, 
edited by Se-Jin Kim and Chang·hyun Cho (Silver Springs: The Research Institute 
on Korean Affairs, 1976), pp. 115-137. 
63. David Cole and Princeton Lyman, Korean Development: The Interplay of 
Politics and Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. v. 
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distortions emerging in the economy,"64 the remarkable develop-
ments of various sectors of the economy substantially improved 
the quality of life in South Korea. This in turn helped Koreans to 
gradually have confidence in the political system. Such economic 
improvement was an unwelcoming situation to North Korean 
unification strategists. Furthermore, in comparison to the South, 
the North Korean economy was beginning to slow down in this 
period.65 This slowdown of the economy, the expense of the 
expansion of the propaganda campaigns abroad, and military 
expenditures created financial difficulties for the North Korean 
government. Financial problems also weakened north Korean 
propaganda purposes in the South. Many South Koreans did in 
fact favorably view the North Korean economic capacity. This 
favorable view, however, could no longer be sustained. In this 
regard, as Professor Sang-Wood Lee points out, in economic terms 
time was working in favor of South Korea.66 
Second, the rapidly developing relationship between the South 
Korean and Japanese governments was also an important factor 
affecting North Korean strategy. This newly developing relation-
ship was a matter of great concern to North Korea. Although 
there were stormy conflicts over the issue of Japanese-Korean 
rapproachment in South Korea, the political leadership was 
eventually successful in concluding a settlement in 1966. This was 
a grave matter to the North because of the fact that the South 
Korean economy could develop its strength through dependence 
on Japan's powerful resources. Indeed, since the normalization 
treaty Japanese capital and technology has poured into the 
Korean economy. Japanese investment in Korea exceeded for the 
first time that of the U.S. in 1969. This success of Japanese 
investment stimulated other foreign countries to invest their 
capital in South Korea. Furthermore, tactically, North Korea had 
expected that economic discontent would eventually erupt into 
violence in South Korea. This in tum could provide an opportunity 
for North Korea to persuade the South Korean public to generate a 
"people's revolution." To some degree, Japanese-Korean economic 
cooperation helped to reduce the chance of "the people's revolu-
tion" strategy. Moreover, this economic cooperation eventually 
64. See JosephS. Chung, "North Korea's Development Strategy and Economic 
Performance," Se-Jim Kim and Chang-hyon Cho, op. cit., pp. 182-199. 
65. Sang-woo Lee, op. cit., p. 122. 
66. "Let Us Oppose the Revival of Japanese Militarism," Korea Today 
(Supplement, 1970), p. 6. 
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consolidated the political tie between these two countries, in tum 
enhancing the security interests of Japan and the U.S. in South 
Korea. Therefore, as a host of North Korean publications show, 
North Korea, time after time, criticized activities of Japan in 
South Korea as a new "Japanese militarism." Kim made it quite 
clear that "the U.S. imperialists are making preparations for the 
formation of the so-called Pacific Alliance in the Far East. This is 
to rearm the Japanese imperialists and utilize them as a shock-
brigade for an aggressive war against the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea."67 This statement clearly showed the extent of 
North Korean uneasiness about the relationship between South 
Korea and Japan. 
Third, the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict became a 
contributing factor affecting the strategy. The Vietnam conflict 
was the longest and most expensive war that the U.S. has ever 
engaged in. The war caused a societal division which in tum led 
to a lack of consensus in foreign policy direction. This conflict and 
the Cambodian invasion eventually weakened the executive 
power of the U.S. government. North Korea correctly perceived 
that lack of support for the war among the American people forced 
the U.S. government to withdraw from Vietnam. This withdrawal 
created skepticism about the U.S. capacity and willingness to 
protect any of its allies, including South Korea. North Korea was 
also beginning to sense that even if several political elites wanted 
to protect South Korea, there was no assurance of getting 
protection from the U.S. government. This erosion of confidence 
during the war years rapidly increased during the postwar 
Watergate scandal in the U.S. Furthermore, North Korea saw the 
liberalizing effect of American people on Communist political 
systems and perceived that the American public increasingly 
became involved in politicized foreign policy issues. 
Capitalizing on this situation, Kim 11 Sung made it quite clear 
as early as 1970 that "the peaceful unification of the country is 
utterly unthinkable so long as the U.S. imperialist aggression 
army and the present puppets are left alone in South Korea."68 
67. Kim II Sung, Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Fifth 
Congress of the Worker's Party of Korea (Pyongyang: Foreign Language 
Publishing House, 1970), p. 113. 
68. Ibid., p. 117. 
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Sensing the impatience of the American public, Kim made the 
following suggestion: 
A powerful anti-war movement should be waged on a world-
wide scale first of all against U.S. imperialism's criminal 
aggression on Vietnam, and all the anti-imperialist forces 
should tender more positive support to the people of Indo-
China and other people of fighting countries. Meanwhile, all 
the peace-loving countries and progressive peoples of the 
world should fight more resolutely against the aggressive 
maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists in the divided countries. 69 
Then Kim 11 Sung made a speech at a Pyongyang mass rally on 
March 4, 1974, stating that "those who love the country and the 
nation should not tolerate the machinations of the U.S. and 
Japanese reactionaries to convert South Korea into a permanent 
colony, but compel the U.S. troops to get out of South Korea, 
thwart the Japanese militarists' invasion, and actively tum out to 
build a sovereign, reunified and independent Korea. 70 Further-
more, Kim made it quite clear that "the U.S. imperialists (have) 
started going downhill ... (citing) repeated setbacks in their 
aggressive wars in Indochina, and their hostile policy towards 
China (which) has gone bankrupt. Nowadays the U.S. imperial-
ists are again being dealt fatal blows and are sliding into an 
inextricable quagmire of ruin in Indochina."71 
Perceiving the weakened morale of the American public due to 
the Vietnam War, North Korea attempted to remind Americans 
that on the one hand the Korean peninsula was not worth armed 
involvement in Asia and, on the other hand, the U.S. would have 
to deal with North Korea directly in order to find a peaceful 
settlement allowing American withdrawal from the peninsula. In 
this regard Kim repeatedly signaled to the U.S. that North Korea 
was willing to negotiate with the U.S. by making such statements 
as the one made on October 9, 1975. Kim said, "We insist that a 
peace agreement be signed between the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea and the United States to eliminate the danger 
69. Kim Il Sung, For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea, revised 
edition (New York: Guardian Associates, Inc., 1976), p. 163. 
70. Ibid., p. 179. 
71. Ibid., p. 213. 
NORTH KOREAN UNIFICATION STRATEGY 37 
of another war and guarantee a durable peace in Korea."72 This 
was clearly an attempt on the part of the North to deal directly 
with the U.S., bypassing South Korea in the negotiations process. 
Kim perceived that one effective way to get the U.S. to the 
negotiation table was to create continuous instability on the 
Korean Peninsula while proclaiming his role as a peace maker. In 
this regard, North Korean Supreme People's Assembly even sent a 
letter to the U.S. Congress to "create favorable conditions to 
eliminate tension in Korea" in 1972.73 This was similar to the 
North Vietnamese strategy during the conflict. 
The fourth factor shaping the strategy of North Korea 
involved the political situation in South Korea. As already 
discussed the South Korean economy was booming. Political 
conditions, however, were not very conducive to stability. Since 
1963, when Park barely managed to win election by a plurality of 
42.6 percent, political instability was rife. Many social 
scandals continuously added to societal discontent which eventu-
ally led to criticism of Park's political leadership in the news 
media. To suppress his critics Park's government passed the 
"Press Ethics Law." Although the President again managed to 
win the 1967 election, political discontentment continued. Then 
South Koreans had to endure an unpopular referendum which 
permitted President Park to remain in office for a third term in 
1971. Then the famous revitalization constitution (Yushin Hon-
pub) was passed to maintain President Park in power indefinitely. 
With these political fluctuations the news media increased its 
criticism of the government and in return the Government 
suppressed newspapers. College campuses also became restless 
and frequently were forced to close their doors. To eliminate this 
problem the Government adopted a new tenure system for college 
teachers which resulted in the ousting of more than 400 professors 
from their posts. 
North Korea apparently attempted to derive benefit from this 
situation in South Korea. Kim made it known that "if revolution 
takes place in south Korea we as one and the same nation will not 
just stand by with arms folded but will strongly support the South 
72. See Kim II Sung, A Call for Friendship Between the Peoples of the United 
States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (New York: American-
Korean Friendship and Information Center, n.n.), p. 8. 
73. Ibid., p. 182. 
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Korean people."74 The following speech was made by Kim on 
January 2, 1972: 
The South Korean puppet cliques have lapsed into a serious 
political and economic crisis past recovery and this gives 
them an ever-growing unrest and despiar. Though they are 
trying to find a way out of the blind alley by means of 
proclaiming the so-called state of emergency and starting a 
new fascist tyranny, this is no more than the death-bed 
struggle of the doomed. 75 
Kim boasted that "the South Korean people are waging a staunch 
struggle to overthrow the military fascist dictatorship." Kim also 
confidently stated that. "alarmed by a situation which is 
developing more and more in favor of the revolution as the days 
go by, the puppet clique of South Korea clings as always to the 
coattails of the U.S. imperialists." Perceiving Park's difficulty in 
South Korea Kim laid out a strategy for the opposition by stating: 
The South Korean revolutionaries should strive to expand 
and strengthen the party forces in all places where there are 
workers, peasants and other revolutionary masses and root 
themselves deeply in the masses. To expand and consolidate 
the mass foundation of the Party it is necessary to continue 
to set up mass organization in various forms among the 
toiling people and solidify them. 76 
Affected by and utilizing these various factors, North Korea 
carried out the unification by Vietnamization strategy in this 
period. 
6. A Strategy of Peace Off~nse, 1977 to the Present 
The sixth stage of transformation of the strategy can be 
detected from the year of 1977. During this period in terms of the 
official line of the unification policy there is no significant 
difference from the previous policy position. North Korea, as can 
be seen in a host of Nodong Shinmun editorials and other 
publications, repeated previous policy statements such as foreign 
74. Ibid., p. 88. 
75. Ibid., p. 84. 
76. Kim's The Central Committee Report of the Fifth Congress, op. cit., pp. 
105-106. 
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troop withdrawal from South Korea, North-South confederation, 
and mutual exchange of various fields. It also repeatedly offered a 
measure of peaceful unification. A careful observation of North 
Korea behavior, however, reveals a somewhat different behavorial 
pattern. First, North Korean hostility toward the South, compared 
with the previous period, was gradually modifying. Even North 
Korean violations in the DMZ have become less frequent in 1977 
and 1978. Although North Korean virulent verbal attacks on 
South Korea and its leadership still exist, its violations of the 
armistice and its attempt to infiltrate into South Korea have been 
somewhat reduced from 1977. Second, as Japanese Foreign 
Minister Sonoda observed,77 North Korea's stiff attitude toward 
other countries, notably toward Japan and the United States, has 
been substantially modified. North Korea has so far been more 
actively engaging in a peace offense, particularly abroad, while 
reducing its hostile attitude toward South Korea. 
What is the implication of this attitude? Perhaps sufficient 
time has not yet lapsed to observe more clearly the characteristics 
of North Korean unification strategy. There are, however, a few 
tentative conclusions that can be drawn from available data. 
First, North Korea's peace offense strategy is related with its 
domestic situation. One of the domestic factors involved is the 
economic problem in North Korea. Pyongyang Times, Nodong 
Shinmun, and many other publications reported an economic 
setback of North Korea. Lack of a proper transportation system to 
keep up industrial growth, a serious shortage of electric power, 
lagging agricultural production, and a soaring trade deficit are 
well reported.78 In this context, North Korea launched a new 
ambitious Seven-Year Plan (1978-1984) to improve the economic 
condition. Furthermore, North Korea has had a consistent 
problem with its international payments. North Korea apparently 
defaulted on its payment to Japan and other countries. This in 
turn created a poor image of North Korea in the international 
credit market. Thus, North Korea needed time for domestic 
adjustment. The recent cabinet reshuffle in North Korea was an 
attempt to restore the economic capacity. The promotion of Yi 
Chong Ok from head of the Heavy Industry to Premier shows to 
many Korean observers the seriousness of North Korean attempts 
to build its economy. The new Premier, Yi, announced that by 
77. Donga Ilbo (January 22, 1978). 
78. For a brief but excellent analysis of this problem, see B.C. Koh, "North 
Korea in 1977: Year of Readjustment," Asian Survey (January, 1978), pp. 36-39. 
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1984 North Korea would increase electric power to 56,000-60,000 
megawatts annually and coal production to 7.4-8 million tons 
annually. Many experts feel, however, that in order to achieve 
these goals North Korea needs substantial help from other 
countries. 79 
The other domestic factor is political leadership. Korean 
observers have widely speculated upon the successor to Kim II 
Sung for the last several years. One speculation revolves around 
the idea that Kim II Sung's oldest son, Kim Chong II, has 
consolidated his leadership position by eliminating his uncle, Kim 
Young Ju, from the leadership contention.80 Some disagree 
arguing that Kim Chong II was deeply involved with the sloppy 
execution of the Six-Year Plan. He was also at the forefront of the 
so-called Three Great Revolutions, namely of thought, technology 
and culture, a somewhat similar movement to the Cultural 
Revolution in China. This in turn created many criticisms of his 
political style. Perhaps it is sometimes required to surface the 
truth of the internal story. It is, however, apparent that there is 
uncertainty, perhaps even conflict, over the succession of aging 
President Kim II Sung in North Korea. At this juncture North 
Korea apparently attempts to avoid any serious external provoca-
tion. 
Second, the peace offense strategy is an outcome of North 
Korea's attempts to deal with a newly emerging external situation 
in South Korea. The Vietnamization policy of North Korea, 
instead of creating social disorder, consolidated South Koreans. 
South Koreans are united in their fear of continuous North 
Korean provocations. This has had a dysfunctional effect on 
North Korean strategy. Furthermore, the U.S. troop withdrawal 
plan has added to President Park's political strength in South 
Korea.81 In this context South Korea's government is anxious to 
develop its own military capacity to balance North Korea's 
superior capability. The implication is that should North Korea 
push too far South Korea might attempt to develop an independ-
ent nuclear force. Kim II Sung of North Korea expressed this fear 
by stating that "to achieve the independent and peaceful 
79. See Susumu Awanohara, "North Korea," Far Eastern Economic Review 
(January 6, 1978), pp. 7-8. 
80. See The Donga Ilbo (February 25, 1977). 
81. See Young Whan Kihl, "Korea's Future: Seoul's Perspective," Asian 
Survey (November, 1977), pp. 1064-1076. 
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reunification of the fatherland, it is imperative to ease tensions 
between the North and the South and to remove the danger of 
nuclear war."82 In this regard, Kim 11 Sung made it quite clear 
that "we (North Koreans) have no intention of arming ourselves 
with nuclear weapons."B3 
North Korea's appeasement attitude is also a reflection of the 
North Korean effort to avoid jeopardizing U.S. ground troop 
withdrawal from South Korea. As already discussed, North Korea 
repeatedly demanded U.S. troop withdrawal from the Korean 
Peninsula in order to achieve a peaceful unification of Korea. 
While the U.S. decision is less than North Korea hoped to achieve, 
North Korea recognizes that President Carter's decision created a 
measure of displeasure in the United States. Therefore, any 
serious provocation from North Korea might well bring a set-back 
of the troop withdrawal plan. In this regard the strategy of peace 
offense is a logical outgrowth of internal and external circumstan-
ces. 
North Korean Unification Strategy since 1948 can be divided 
into six distinct stages: 
First Stage 
Second Stage 
Third Stage 
Fourth Stage 
Fifth Stage 
Sixth Stage 
Time Period 
1948-1953 
1954-1956 
1957-1960 
1961-1965 
1966-1976 
1977-
Unification Strategy 
Massive War 
Peaceful Coexistence 
Peaceful Unification 
People's Democratic 
Revolution 
Vietnamization 
Peaceful Offense 
As the summary of North Korean unification strategy shows, 
North Korea has changed its unification strategy several time; 
from massive war strategy to that of peaceful coexistence, from 
coexistence to peaceful unification strategy followed by a strategy 
of People's Revolution, and then from the strategy of People's 
Revolution to Vietnamization. This flunctuation of strategy very 
often occurred due to the deliberated will of the leadership of 
North Korea. Changes in strategy, however, have frequently been 
82. FBIS, Daily Report (February 9, 1977), p. D9. 
83. Kim II Sung, For the Independent Peaceful Unification of Korea, op. cit., p. 
233. 
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forced upon the North Korean leadership by various uncontrolla-
ble external factors such as the international environment. 
Furthermore, even North Korean internal matters have frequently 
forced the North Korean leadership to shift its strategy regarding 
unification. In this regard, while unification will remain one of the 
highest national goals for all Koreans, North Korean unification 
strategy will continue to be constantly in motion as national 
pride, political self-interest, domestic priorities and international 
events compete with or complement each other. 
PART II: UNIFICATION POLICY OF SOUTH KOREA 
1. Unification Policy of the First Republic, 
1953-1960 
On July 27, 1953, the Armistice Agreement was signed which 
stipulated that "the peaceful settlement of the Korean question" 
be arranged in the near future. Unfortunately, the failure at 
Panmunjom to arrange a high-level political conference led to the 
Berlin Conference. On February 18, 1954, at the Berlin Confer-
ence, an agreement was reached to call the Geneva Conference for 
the purpose of arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Korean 
question."84 At this conference, Foreign Minister Pyon Young Tae 
of South Korea proposed a unification plan: 
1. Free elections shall be held under United Nations supervi-
sion. 
2. The free elections shall be held in North Korea, in 
accordance with the constitutional processes of the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea). 
3. The U.N. personnel connected with the supervision of the 
elections shall enjoy full freedom. 
4. The all-Korean legislature shall be convened in Seoul 
immediately after theelections. 
5. The existing Constitution of the Republic of Korea shall 
remain in force. ss 
Throughout the Conference, South Korea persistently de-
manded that certain requirements be met for a Korean settlement. 
They were, first, the authority and competence of the United 
Nations to deal with Korea must be recognized; second, Commu-
nist Chinese forces must be withdrawn before the election; third, 
free elections, with proportionate representation based on the 
population, should be held; and, finally, U.N. forces should remain 
in Korea until the mission of the United Nations had been 
accomplished by the creation of "a unified, independent, and 
democratic Korea." 
This policy of South Korea was consistently upheld. Then at 
the Eighth National Convention of the ruling Liberal Party on 
84. See the State Department, Bulletin (March 1, 1954), pp. 317-318. 
85. The State Department, The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), pp. 84-89. 
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March 28, 1957, Rhee's Liberal Party adopted an official policy for 
reunification. Again, it claimed that only the Chinese Army must 
be withdrawn from North Korea. After complying with this 
condition, only North Korea should hold a free election under the 
supervision of the U.N.86 The South Korean National Assembly, 
which was dominated by the Liberal Party, passed a resolution 
calling for the withdrawal of the Chinese Army. Furthermore, this 
resolution demanded that South Korea alone must be accepted in 
the United Nations, and free elections should be held only within 
the North Korean areas under the supervision of the U.N.87 
This was a quite intransigent policy. This attitude of the 
ruling party was most widespread in 1959, prior to the national 
election to be held March 15, 1960. The Liberal Party campaigned 
under the platform of 'jmarch ·to the North." The Liberal Party 
declared that reunification must be achieved by invading North 
Korea, and suggested in October, 1959, three different possible 
alternatives: First, marching to the North with the cooperation of 
the U.N.; second, initiating a massive military campaign with the 
cooperation of the U.S. Army; and third, marching the South 
Korean Army alone into the North.88 These unrealistic alterna-
tives of the Liberal Party were characteristic of the unification 
policy of South Korea under the First Republic. 
The question remains, why had the First Republic of South 
Korea taken such an intransigent unification policy position? 
There were several factors which contributed to such a hardline 
policy posture. First, the societal history was a major contributing 
factor to South Korea's unification policy. The South Korean 
intransigent attitude toward North Korea was due to the 
experience the society as a whole had had in the past. After the 
liberation from Japan, South Korea was plunged into a conflict 
that was tantamount to war between rightists and leftists. The 
domestic conflict between rightists and the leftists, deliberately 
acerbated and manipulated by Communists, was so widespread 
that it encompassed labor unions, the military establishments, 
journalists, and even the high school and university student 
populations in South Korea. 
Probably the most detrimental factor to improving the South 
Korean attitude was the Korean conflict which lasted three years. 
86. Chosun Ilbo (March 29, 1957). 
87. Donga Ilbo (Szptember 11, 1957). 
88. See various newspapers, including Seoul Sinmun, Chosun Ilbo, Donga 
Ilbo, from October 5 to October 19, 1959. 
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During the three years of fighting, millions of Koreans suffered 
and thousands of families were dislocated. In Kyung Cho Chung's 
assessment the Korean War became a political and a psychologi-
cal symbol to the people of South Korea.89 The war resulted in 
more than a million South Korean deaths. During the conflict, 
South Korea moved its capital to three different places, and many 
Koreans experienced the tragedy of fratricide. Local Communists 
severely punished "the element of the right," the rightists in turn 
took revenge on "the red element." Understandably, South 
Koreans blamed all of these tragedies on North Korea's attack. As 
Americans well know from their own history animosity resulting 
from a civil war heals slowly - the memory of the Korean War 
remained vividly alive during the late 1950's and early 1960's. 
Another social factor to be considered was a growing distrust 
by South Koreans of the Liberal Party and its politics. With 
growing disenchantment about existing conditions due to the 
scarce resources, overpopulation and scandals involving govern-
ment officials and military personnel, a pervasive mistrust of 
those wielding power developed. President Rhee's political 
strength relied greatly on military groups. Many of these military 
groups were allegedly infected with social corruption. Publicized 
scandals such as the National Defense Corp's embezzlement of 
defense funds90 and the Kochang massacre of many innocent 
people, made a mockery of Rhee's "democratic" government. 
Furthermore, Rhee's government was so incensed by his oppo-
nents that, as pointed out by Richard Allen, "he (President Rhee) 
had come increasingly to equate opposition to himself with pro-
Communism."91 
Social discontent continued. Of course by 1957 some of the 
war damage had been repaired. The economic growth rate had 
risen. However, the annual growth of per capita real income from 
1956 was less than two percent. The rapid increase of population, 
89. Kyung Cho Chung, Korea Tomorrow (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1961), p. 260. Also Professor Hankyo Kim states that the memory of the 
Korean War is an important factor in the South Korea policy toward North Korea. 
See Hankyo Kim, "South Korean Policy Toward North Korea," Major Powers and 
Korea, edited by Young C. Kim (Silver Springs, Maryland: Research Institute on 
Korean Affairs, 1973), pp. 117-118. 
90. For the detailed stoyr, see "Minjok Eui Jungun," (Testimony of Nation), 
Joongang Ilbo (April, 1972). 
91. Richard Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. 
Tuttle Company, 1960), p. 135. 
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moreover, virtually nullified all sectors of economic growth. The 
financial disequilibrium of the government worsened the situation 
of chronic underemployment and poverty. Adding to this problem 
policy brutality and the rigging of elections of public offices were 
widespread. Suppression of the free press hindered various social 
activities. 
Throughout Korean history the ruler's domination over his 
obedient people characterized the authoritarian nature of Korean 
politics.92 After the end of Japanese rule, however, the ideal of 
liberalism was openly introduced into South Korean society. The 
great enthusiasm for Western political ideals made virtually every 
political party adopt the ideal of liberal democracy as the most 
important fact of the ideological foundation underlying South 
Korean politics. The political thoughts of Montesquieu and of 
Locke were taught from middle school to college. The Liberal 
Party government's policy of dictatorial control of the society was 
quite contrary to the ideas that many people supported in this 
period. The gap between ideals and reality was much wider in city 
areas where people were generally more educated and sophisti-
cated. This caused widespread desertions by intellectual groups 
from South Korean society. 
Under the circumstances of mounting social discontent and 
intellectual revolt against the existing regime, the National 
Security Law was introduced and passed December 24, 1958. This 
law provided for death sentences or heavy prison terms for vague 
crimes such as disseminating communist propaganda. Under this 
law anyone who opposed and criticized the Liberal Party's 
government was guilty of treason. As the government increased 
its repression of civil liberties the ill will of the people toward the 
government also increased. To suppress this ill will the govern-
ment attempted to reinforce pressure on the society. One of the 
most dramatic incidents was the closing by the government of one 
of the most popular newspapers, Kyunghyang Shinmun, under 
the pretext that the paper's employees had helped North Korean 
spies and had reported false information. After closing down the 
paper the government threatened the public by stating that "any 
publications will face the same destiny if they commit such 
crimes." This was a shocking act to the Korean public. Further-
more, the law which was the instrument of the punishment was 
temporarily enacted by the American military administration to 
92. See Yoon Chun Choo, "Hankuk-in Eui Jongchi Haengtae" (Korean 
Political Behavior), Journal of Asiatic Studies (June, 1960), pp. 8-9. 
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suppress local communist activity in South Korea. Thus to the 
public the legal basis of the punishment was gravely in doubt. 93 
This kind of social discontent and the Liberal Party government's 
action to suppress social dissatisfaction were critical factors in the 
intransigent behavior with regard to reunification in this period. 
The government's actions were always justified in terms of 
national security. This in turn led to an extreme "anti-communist" 
policy. 
The second factor is related to the personalities of South 
Korean political leaders. The beliefs of South Korean leaders 
greatly influenced the policy of South Korea. The importance of 
personality in the decision-making process has been emphasized 
in political science literature. Professor Ole Holsti finds that "a 
decision-maker acts upon his image of the situation rather than 
upon objective reality."94 After having done a case study "Why 
Nations Go To War," Professor John Stoessinger concludes that 
the personalities of political leaders have often been a decisive 
factor. 95 Numerous scholars find a significant correlation between 
personality and the political decision-making process, for exam-
ple: Smith, Boulding, Festinger, Singer, Greenstein, de Rivera, 
and many others. An empirical determination as to what extent 
such a relationship exists in each case is, of course, a polemical 
issue. A study of the Korean leadership in this period clearly 
indicates that the personalities of the leaders strongly affected 
their anti-Communist attitude. All leaders who had ruled South 
Korea, notably Syngman Rhee, were staunch "anti-Communists." 
South Korean leaders shared a strong belief that Communist 
leaders cared for nothing but the cause of their revolutionary 
movement. Thus South Korean leaders had a deep distrust of 
Korean Communists. This feeling of the leaders is deeply rooted in 
Korean political history. As early as the 1920's the conflict 
between President Syngman Rhee of the Korean Provisional 
Government in Shanghai and its premier Yi Tong-hwi, who was 
93. Shin Sang Cho, "Koonchung Bupryung Je Palsip Palho Eui Yooryung" 
(The Ghost of the Article Eighty-Eight of the Military Government Law), Sasang 
Ge (June, 1959), pp. 22-23. 
94. Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," 
International Politics and Foreign Policy, edited by James N. Posenau (New York: 
The Free Press, 1963), pp. 543-544. 
95. John G. Stoesinger, Why Nations Go To War (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1974), pp. 222. 
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then representing the Shanghai faction of the Korean Communist 
movement, was a well-known historical incident.96 Even after the 
liberation from Japan, serious adversity between rightist and 
leftist leaders never ended in Korea. After the ill-fated attempt of 
Kim Koo and Kim Kyu Sik to negotiate with North Korean 
Communists in order to establish a unified national government 
the skepticism of South Korean leaders toward Korean Commu-
nists resulted in stalemating any sort of fruitful negotiations. 
Furthermore, even until June 25, 1950, when North Korea 
launched a massive campaign against the South, North Korea 
was still proposing a peaceful solution for the problem faced by 
and created by both sides. 
These historical experiences actually reinforced the strong 
belief among South Korean political leaders that Communists are 
not worthy of trust. All of the South Korean ruling leaders had 
become fearful and antagonistic against the North Korean 
Communist regime. Besides the top leaders on the power echelon 
many secondary leaders, particularly in the military, are people 
who escaped from North Korea because the North became a 
Communist regime.97 South Korea, of course, had had a number of 
political leaders, such as Cho Bong Am, Kim Dahl Ho and Chang 
Kon Sang, who were less susceptible to this fear about Commu-
nism. They had never had, however, any opportunity to control 
the South Korean Government. Thus the image and perceptions 
South Korean political leaders held concerning Korean Commu-
nists affected South Korean unification policy position. 
Third, the political factor was also a major force shaping 
unification policy. This factor includes as components the 
structural arrangement of a governmental system, the political 
leadership structure within the government, and the governmen-
tal capacity to mobilize political support for its goal. One of the 
problems that the Rhee government constantly had to face was 
the absence of the ability to get strong popular support for the 
ruling government. This, of course, was frequently due to the 
failure of the government to convince other groups and the 
general public that it had to remain in power. 
96. For an excellent study on Korean Communist movements, see Dae-Sook 
Suh, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1967). 
97. For a detailed account of the North Korean original military group, see Se-
Jin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1971). 
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From 1950, President Rhee's support in the National Assem-
bly quickly diminished. Determined to prevent Rhee's reelection in 
1952, the opposing groups in the National Assembly attacked the 
Rhee Government for various scandals and inefficiencies. In this 
situation Rhee's prospects for reelection as the president by the 
Assembly were ill-regarded. Perceiving this reality Rhee and his 
group mobilized and used some political groups, such as the 
National Society and Korean Youth Corps, in ways that were 
illegal under a democratic constitution. Furthermore, on the 
pretext of guerrilla activities, martial law was declared. Many of 
the Assemblymen were arrested on their way to the Assembly 
Hall. Some of them were court-martialed on charges of communist 
conspiracy. It was hardly surprising that the Assembly finally 
adopted the constitutional amendments providing for the popular 
election of the President and Vice-President. 
Then another problem awaited the President. Under the 
Constitution at that time a third presidential term was prohibited. 
On August 6, 1954, the Liberal Party introduced a constitutional 
amendment aimed at deleting the restriction on the President's 
serving a third term. Against stormy opposition the ruling party 
forced through the legislature a bill with a notorious rule known 
as the rule of "rounding off any fraction under 0.5." Then the 
ruling party again passed a bill called the Government Reorgani-
zation Bill on February 7, 1955. This bill included provisions, 
among others, to enable the President to hold office for more than 
two consecutive four-year terms, to allow the President to appoint 
all members of the State Council and to abolish the previous right 
of the Assembly to impeach members of the State Council.98 These 
are only a few examples of how the executive interfered in the 
functioning of the legislature. All of these made Rhee's govern-
ment very unpopular. In the 1956 presidential election, in spite of 
the sudden death of his arch-rival, Shin Ik Hi, Rhee barely 
managed to win 56 percent of the vote. Even though he was the 
only major candidate, nearly 1.9 million "invalid" ballots were 
cast for the dead opposition candidate. Nearly 2.2 million votes 
were cast for the third party candidate, Cho Bong Am. The 
Democratic candidate for vice-president, Chang Myon, success-
fully defeated Rhee's personal nominee, Lee Ki Boong. 
Then as a result of the election of May 2, 1958, the Liberal 
Party had to face serious opposition to constitutional change in 
98. The National Assembly, Taehan Minguk Kukhoe Kaekwan (Seoul: The 
National Assembly, 1959), p. 7. 
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the National Assembly. Although the Liberal Party won the 
election with a majority, it was far from the two-thirds majority 
needed to pass a constitutional amendment. In dealing with this 
circumstance the Liberal Party introduced a series of constitu-
tional amendments and the National Security Law. The Demo-
crats perceived the intention of this legislation as a legal device 
for use in the 1960 presidential elections. They strongly opposed 
this legislation and finally conducted a week-long "sitdown 
strike" against the bill in the National Assembly. The Liberal 
Party called uniformed .J>Oli~enien and carried the resisting 
members out of the hall and locked them in the basement. While 
.. l 
the legality of :the Liberal J>arty~s action was in doubt,99 the 
Liberal Party Government managed to abolish the autonomy of 
local governmeljlt ~nd" tO ;est~blish a "compact rider" for the 
President and Vice-President. 
While conflict between the ruling party and the opposition 
was at a high point in the National Assembly, the newly emerged 
Progressive Party was gaining the attention of the public. As 
indicated, the leader of the Progressive Party, Cho Bong Am, was 
an arch-rival of Rhee in the 1956 Presidential election, and won 
almost 2.2 million votes. Cho urged an immediate consideration of 
peaceful reunification of Korea. 100 Furthermore, the Progressive · 
Party adopted a resolution in November, 1958, calling for peaceful 
unification. 
The Progressive Party's strong stand for peaceful unification 
provided an ample opportunity for the Rhee Government to 
intervene and punish its members for public opposition. In 1958 
the police arrested most of the Party leaders and charged them 
with violation of the National Security Law. The charges brought 
up by the police were (a) that the peaceful unification proposal of 
the. Party was identical with the North Korean proposal and 
would jeopardize the existence of the Republic; (b) that an article 
by Cho Bong Am which appeared in the October issue of 
Choongang Jungchi was subversive because it advocated "all-
Korean elections as a means for unification;" (c) that Cho Bong 
Am illegally possessed weapons and secret documents, including 
a copy of a letter written to Kim D Sung; and (d) that Cho received 
99. Kim Byung No, "ly Sa Padong Yukam" (A Pity to the 24th Thoughtless 
Undertaking), Sasang Ge (March, 1959), p. 20. 
100. Choongang Jungchi (October, 1958). 
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forty million hwan from North Korea for his presidential 
campaign funds.1o1 
The massive police arrests occurred four months before the 
National Assembly elections of 1958. Furthermore, the evidence 
brought by the police to indict members of the Progressive Party 
was unverifiable. Some. of it was highly circumstantial.102 
Indirectly it signaled that the Liberal Party intended to punish 
any opponents. With this, Rhee's Government made it clear again 
that "unification through a march toward the North" must be the 
only policy for South Korea. The court finally sentenced Cho Bong 
Am to death and outlawed the Progressive Party. 
The interlocking relationship between the Liberal Party and 
governmental organization became so pervasive that the ruling 
party was involved in every aspect of governmental organization. 
The party's oppression of civil liberties was almost unbearable to 
many Koreans. One Korean scholar called it "a privileged class," 
not a political party.103 The interlocking relationship involved 
even the military organization in South Korea. After the removal 
of the insubordinant General Yi Chong Chan from the post of 
Army Chief of Staff, "those whom Rhee could not control 
completely were never again appointed to any of the key military 
positions."104 Ever since then a strong tie between the military 
and the Liberal Party developed. Furthermore, the increasing 
number of military personnel reached almost 600,000 in 1956. 
North Korea's peaceful unification proposal was based on a 
presupposition that the size of the military would be reduced to 
about 100,000 men. This was unacceptable to the South Korean 
Army. Thus many South Korean military leaders pledged blind 
loyalty to the rightist President Rhee. Under these circumstances, 
perhaps the only legitimacy the Liberal Party Government had 
came from its claim that President Rhee and his Government were 
champions of "the anti-Communist" movement. Under this 
banner, the ruling government contended that "anyone against us 
is a Communist." 
The fourth factor was attributable to the external environ-
ment of South Korea. South Korea was a highly penetrated 
101. The Voice of Korea (July 3, 1958). 
102. See Yim Hong Bin, "Jooksan Cho Bong Am Eui Jookum," (The Death of 
Cho Bung Am), Shin Donga (August, 1965), pp. 368-370. 
103. Yi Chong Kyuk, "J ayiou Tang" (The Liberal Party), Sasang Ge (February, 
1956), p. 249. 
104. Se-Jin Kim, op. cit., p. 52. 
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system, particularly by the U.S. Thus South Korea's intransi-
gency was in large measure due to, and successful because of, its 
influence on U.S. Cold War policy. The U.S. policies, Truman's 
containment, and Dulles' rollback and massive retaliation policy, 
were based upon a predisposition toward certain ways and means 
of thwarting Communist expansion. The fall of Chiang's China to 
communist forces and the Indochina and Korean War aroused 
criticisms of Truman's containment policy in the United States. 
Dulles stressed that the American foreign policy objective "should 
not be to coexist indefinitely with the Communist menace, it 
should be to eliminate that menace."l05 Dulles' statement of 
offensive strategy was called the new look "that depends 
primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means 
and at places of our choosing." Thus it was stated that the policy 
was to permit "selection of military means instead of a multiplica-
tion of means."106 All of these policies provided a moral and 
psychological boost and "referential point" to the rightists in 
South Korea. The policy of stressing the United Nations as the 
means through which Korean unification was to be achieved also 
coincided with U.S. strategy to use the international organization 
as a means of achieving its policy objectives. This confluence of 
policy objectives between the two countries became an important 
factor influencing the South Korean unification policy position. 
Thus, this condition helped Rhee's government to establish an 
aura of legitimacy as the "Champion of 'anti-Communism'." 
2. The Second Republic's Unification Policy, 
1960-1961 
As a new decade began a great internal political transforma-
tion occurred in South Korea. The Liberal Party Government was 
finally crippled by the student uprising of April 19, 1960. The 
Democratic Party, which became the ruling party of the Second 
Republic, proposed a general policy line for reunifications on July 
26 before the national election of July 29, 1960. The policy stated: 
1. A peaceful and democratic unification supervised by the 
United Nations must be achieved by free national 
elections in North and South Korea. 
105. Quoted from John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 104. 
106. Ibid., p. 107. 
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2. The composition of the supervisory body for the election 
will be decided by the resolution of the U.N. The members 
of the body should be selected from those U.N. member 
nations which have held free elections. 
3. The proposal to establish a unified committee of South 
and North Korea before the all-Korean election violates 
the U.N. resolution that the Republic of Korea is the sole 
legitimate government of Korea, and therefore the 
proposal cannot be accepted. 
4. Since there is no guarantee that the Communist conspi-
racy to destroy the Republic of Korea will be stopped, 
cultural and economic exchanges before the reunification 
is achieved should be refused. 
5. The unified Korea should be a state which preserves 
democracy and free civil rights. Therefore, neither a "red 
dictatorship," nor a "white dictatorship" can be accep-
ted.l07 
The Foreign Minister of the Second Republic, Chung Il 
Hyong, issued a statement on August 24, 1960 that "the 
unification by military means as advocated by the Liberal Party 
Government in the past is so thoughtless that such a policy must 
be renounced."108 Prime Minister Chang Myon also made known 
his view on unification policy in a speech concerning administra-
tive policies presented in the National Assembly on August 29, 
1960. According to the speech, "a democratic and peaceful 
unification must materialize under the principle designated by the 
United Nations."109 To achieve unification the Prime Minister 
suggested a national election throughout South and North Korea 
under the supervision of the United Nations. The Fifth National 
Assembly under the Second Republic passed a resolution concern-
ing a Korean unification plan on November 2, 1960. The 
resolution stated that "after the measure to guarantee a perpetual 
and solid national security and people's freedom is enacted 
according to the U.N. principles, then national elections will be 
held on the basis of the population ratio under the procedure 
107. Korean National Assembly, White Paper on the Unification (Seoul: The 
Library of the National Assembly, 1971), p. 244. 
108. Kyunghyang Shinmun (August 24, 1960). 
109. The White Paper, op. cit., p. 216. 
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provided by the Republic of Korea's constitution effected under the 
supervision of the U.N."no 
At this point in our investigation of the unification proposals 
it seems clear that the position taken by the Chang Myon 
Government was somewhat different from the position of the 
previous regime. For one thing, the policy of the "March to North" 
was entirely renounced as an official policy of the Second 
Republic. Second, an important change to note is that the idea of 
peaceful unification emerged as a legitimate policy. Compared 
with the official line of the Rhee Government this was a quite 
drastic change of attitude toward unification policy. Furthermore, 
the First Republic's political assertion that the election must be 
held only within North Korea was entirely dropped from the 
governmental position. Instead, a proposal for simultaneous 
national elections throughout North and South Korea was 
incorporated into the policy line. 
To all appearances, at least superficially, the Chang Myon 
Government was willing to peacefully settle the Korean division 
with North Korea. Careful analysis discloses, however, that 
Chang's proposal was not a drastic demarche from the policy of 
the First Republic. Some of the conditions suggested by the South 
Korean Government were utterly unacceptable to North Korea. 
Chang's insistence on the U.N. as the sole authoritative 
supervisory body for the national election was merely a reiteration 
of the position upheld by the previous government. Considering 
the fact that North Korea fought against U.N. forces, North Korea 
could not accept the U.N. as a disinterested neutral party to 
supervise national elections for reunification. This was under-
stood by the First Republic and was utilized by the Rhee 
Government to counter North Korean propaganda. Reappearance 
of the demand that national elections be held under "the 
procedures of the South Korean constitution" was also similar to 
the position of the previous government. Despite the fact that the 
official attitude toward peaceful unification had perceptably 
changed, the policy of the Second Republic preserved many 
elements of its predecessor's policy. Thus, while the intransigent 
and hostile behavior of the Liberal Party Government was 
publicly denounced, Chang's Government attempted to preserve 
the status quo of unification politics. 
110. Tongil Moonje Jean Jaryo Jip (Materials on the Unification Questions) 
(Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 1972), p. 19. 
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There remains a question: why had the Second Republic of 
South Korea taken such a position? There were a number of 
factors affecting the unification position of South Korea. First, the 
social factor was important. This factor was due in part to the 
student uprising of April19, 1960, which led to the crippling of the 
First Republic. The student revolution made a great impact on the 
Second Republic, even though it was not motivated by support for 
Chang Myon's political party. Thus Chang's subsequent oppor-
tunity to run the Second Republic was not earned through a 
political struggle against the Rhee Government, but rather was 
the result of unexpected circumstances. The student uprising 
heralded many emerging social problems. 
After Chang Myon assumed the political leadership on 
August 23, 1960, he encountered troubles from several different 
directions. Frequent public demonstrations, particularly by 
students, were a very difficult problem confronting Chang Myon. 
These demonstrations had a great dysfunctional effect on the 
ruling leadership. After two generations of suppression, the 
sudden discovery of "public opinion"111 created the widespread 
impression that any objective could be achieved by demonstra-
tions. This illusion brought people into the streets on every 
conceivable issue. It is estimated that there were about 2,000 
demonstrations during the one-year period.112 
Student demonstrations were among the most vocal expres-
sions of public opinion. Numbers of students actively engaged in 
demanding various commitments from the government which 
ranged from purging some university professors to removing a 
number of government officials. On one occasion a group of 
students occupied the National Assembly and demanded the 
enactment of a harsh law against several former government 
functionaries with strong connections to the Liberal Party. Even 
Prime Minister Chang was frequently forced to "listen to the 
harangue of the leaders of the students, who were by now called 
the fourth branch of the Chang regime."113 
One of the most serious developments was the sudden vocal 
demand for national unification initiated by students and late 
111. Richard Allen, "South Korea: The New Regime," Pacific Affairs (Spring, 
1961), p. 54. 
112. Stephen Bradnew, "Korea: Experiment and Instability," Japan Quarterly 
(October-December, 1961), p. 414. 
113. John Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1968), p. 80. 
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echoed by some adult groups. On November 2,1960, a group called 
the Minjok Tongil Yonmaeng (National Students Federation for 
National Unification) demanded that Prime Minister Chang visit 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union to discuss Korean unification.114 
The Mintong Central Committee made other demands, such as 
exchanging mail between the South and the North, economic 
transactions, exchanging news reporters and the organization of 
unified sports teams for participation in international Olympic 
Games.115 A group of Seoul National University students 
demanded the convening of a South-North Korean student 
conference, the exchange of student reporters, the opening of a 
dialogue among academies on both sides, the creation of a South-
North Korean students' good will athletic convention and the end 
of political interference in students' activities.116 
This highly vocal and growing agitation by students stirred 
the nervous social climate. Antagonism between rightists and 
leftists made Koreans of any prominence abnormally sensitive to 
the possibility of danger from the left.117 Though the Min tong took 
a strong stance for Korean Nationalism, its action was alarming 
to conservatives, particularly to many military officers. Those 
who feared Communist penetration of the student movement 
could 
hardly help noticing three things: that it was drawing 
financial support from Japan; the criticism of the United 
States structured in terms of Communist theory was often 
incorporated into discussions of unification; and that many 
of the slogans were surprisingly similar to those used by 
Radio Pyongyang in North Korea and Communist groups 
elsewhere.11B 
A group of students whose leaders advocated peaceful unification 
were trying to arrange a debate with North Korean students at 
Panmunjom. This condition, particularly shocking to conserva-
tives and a number of army officers, provoked some strong voices 
who urged that these excessive enjoyments of freedom be curbed 
by the government before they got out of hand. 
114. Donga Ilbo (November 1, 1960). 
115. Donga Ilbo (February 29, 1961). 
116. Chosun flbo (May 4, 1961). 
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Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 179. 
118. Stephen Bradmer, loc. cit., p. 414. 
SOUTH KOREAN UNIFICATION POLICY 57 
Outrageously irresponsible journalism was another social 
problem that the Chang Myon government had to face in South 
Korea. Under Chang's government, the Korean people enjoyed 
more freedom than in any other period of Korean history. 
Unfortunately, this almost unlimited freedom tended to be abused 
and was carried to extremes by the press. The amended 
constitution made it difficult for the government to regulate the 
mushrooming press by statute, and the number of newspapers 
and periodicals jumped suddenly from about 600 to nearly 1,600 
by April 1961. Few of the new publications had printing facilities, 
and some had no fixed place of business. Their principal, and in 
some cases their only, business was blackmail.119 Some of these 
newspapers took advantage of the situation and openly urged a 
swift reunification, while others reported students' demands in a 
highly exaggerated fashion. Gregory Henderson summed it up 
very well: 
Almost all tried to make money by purveying sensational 
and often inaccurate information . . . some money support-
ing a very few publications with a slightly leftist editorial 
line was beginning to creep in from Communist-controlled 
sources in Japan. Leftist or not, almost no newspapers had 
any thoughtful regard or sympathy for the problems the 
Chang regime was struggling to solve in a democratic 
framework.120 
This irresponsible journalism made it highly difficult for 
Chang's Government to decide public policy. A highly sensitive 
issue such as unification policy was well publicized, exaggerated, 
and very often manipulated by various newspapers and this, in 
turn, nurtured public pressure on the government to take a stand. 
The critical press, however, did not offer any clear line of direction 
for unification. 
Second, political factors were also critical of the Second 
Republic's preservative policy toward unification. One of the 
political factors was related to the structural rearrangement of the 
political system. Under the First Republic, the characteristics of 
the presidential system prevailed. The presidential system was 
transformed into a parliamentary system under the Second 
republic, primarily to weaken executive power. Many South 
119. John Oh, op. cit., pp. 90-91. 
120. Gregory Henderson, op. cit., p. 180. 
58 CoNTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
Koreans thought that the main reason for Rhee's dictatorship was 
the unusually strong executive structure in relation to the 
legislature. In this regard, on June 14, the interim government of 
Hehr Chung promulgated constitutional amendments weakening 
the power of the executive. Thus the National Assembly was 
strengthened and expanded to 233 members for the lower house, 
and 158 for the new upper house. 
This substantial shift of power from the executive to the 
legislative exacerbated the chronic problem of factional conflicts 
in the National Assembly. This, in turn, damaged Chang Myon's 
political leadership in performing governmental functions. Histor-
ically, factional conflict was characteristic of Korean politics121 
and the overwhelming election victory of the Democratic Party 
intensified the factional conflict between the Old and the New 
factions and between senior and junior factions. To meet various 
demands from different factions and groups, Prime Minister 
Chang reshuffled his cabinet three times in less than nine 
months. The average tenure of ministers under Chang was only 
six months, and particularly of home ministers, who controlled 
the national policy force, less than two months.122 Thus, very 
often, factional conflicts paralyzed the routine functioning of the 
government. The National Assembly became a mere marketplace 
for the advancement of the personal interests of its members. 
Under these circumstances, especially in view of the fact that a 
major course of political power was vested in the National 
Assembly, it would have been a miracle had Chang's leadership 
been able to perform governmental functions in a proper way. 
Some members of the Assembly even openly advocated radical 
unification plans unacceptable to many South Koreans. Further-
more, since unification policy was so sensitive and potentially 
controversial an issue, Chang's Government was reluctant to take 
a more drastic step. 
Chang Myon also had to face a political difficulty outside the 
National Assembly. After the downfall of Rhee's regime, there 
emerged numerous political parties: progressive parties, the 
Popular Socialist Party and the Democratic Reform Party. A 
number of left-wing parties were absorbing remnants of the 
121. Koh Young Bok, "Chungtang Kwa Pabul" (Political Party and Faction), 
Social Science Review: A Special Issue on Symposium on Korean Political Party 
(Seoul: Social Science Research Institute, 1969), pp. 12~ 144. 
122. See Bae-ho Hahn and Kyu-taik Kim, "Korean Political Leaders 
(1952-1962): Their Social Origins and Skills," Asian Survey (July, 1963), p. 320. 
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original progressive party led by the late Cho Bong Am. The 
Korean Independent Party, formerly led by the late Kim Koo, was 
also revived as a rightists political group. The political arena of 
the Second Republic was indeed a scene of confusion. 
Even the unification policies of the contending political 
parties were in a state of confusion. The Central Coordination 
Committee of the Korean Nation's Independent Unification 
Organization made the following proposals: mutual mail ex-
change between North and South Korea; economic interchange; 
creation of an organization to provide national harmony at the 
front line; mutual exchange of reporters and observers; and 
dispatching combined North and South Korean teams to compete 
in international athletic contests.123 The Popular Socialist Party 
suggested a scheme of neutralist unification. It proposed that: (1) 
an international conference including both North and South 
Korea be held to guarantee a permanent neutralization of Korea; 
)2) the international body to supervise Korean elections be 
composed of those neutral nations which did not have military 
and political interest in Korea; and (3) after the establishment of a 
unified government, the military capacity must be limited to the 
forces required to preserve a permanent neutrality of Korea.124 
In addition to these examples of unification proposals from 
various political groups, different political parties offered propos-
als ranging from neutralization under U.N. supervision to direct 
negotiations. Even some influential members of the National 
Assembly representing conservative groups talked about the 
possibility of direct negotiation between North and South Korea. 
This proliferation of political parties and their unregulated 
political adventurism opened up all kinds of speculation about 
unification politics. Political forces ranging from individuals to 
political parties tried to take advantage of this unprecedented 
freedom of expression. Many of these political forces did not even 
have a concrete practical program on how to achieve unification. 
Clearly, in these circumstances it would have been very difficult 
for any political leadership to support a well-articulated specific 
plan for such a volatile issue as unification. 
Third, the external influence was another factor contributing 
to Chang Myon's Government's unification position. Though 
official American policy on Korean unification had not changed, 
several important things happened. The Chairman of the U.S. 
123. Minjok Rbo (February 25, 1961). 
124. The White Paper, op. cit., pp. 248-249. 
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright, 
announced that Korean unification must be achieved on a 
voluntary basis without foreign influence. This was a statement 
which stirred Korean nationalism. Yet probably the greatest 
American impact on the Korean unification question stemmed 
from a statement by then Senator mike Mansfield. After a trip to 
the Far East in the summer of 1960, he recommended that "the 
United States should consider most carefully the possibilities of a 
solution to the problems of Korean unification in terms of 
neutralization on the Austrian pattern."125 Chang's government 
immediately rejected the idea of an Austrian-type neutralization 
for the following reasons: the geographical position of Korea is 
not the same as that of Austria or Switzerland because Korea is 
surrounded by the two most powerful Communist states; in 
Austria one government existed even during the four-power 
occupation, but in Korea two regimes, based on entirely opposite 
political ideologies, are in power; and Korea would be dominated 
by Communists if it were unified through neutralization.126 This 
argument was not convincing to many Koreans and it was 
particularly apparent, moreover, that the Austrian-type neutrali-
zation was proposed by a U.S. Senator who was believed to be 
highly influential in American politics. Many Koreans believed 
that because this was a public statement by an American senator, 
the concept of a neutral unification not only stirred up the Korean 
public, it also forced Chang's government into a difficult situa-
tion. 
Another external factor was Chang's newly-opened relation-
ship with Japan. Chang's newly-opened relationship, however, 
was quickly followed by reports that leftist-oriented groups in 
Korea were drawing financial support from Korean residents in 
Japan, who were in turn backed by North Korea. Many 
conservative groups and army officers were alarmed and the 
government was criticized for its permissiveness. Furthermore, a 
number of Korean residents openly advocated neutral unification. 
One of the representative examples was a Korean resident named 
Kim Sam Kyu. As a Chairman of the Committee for the 
Neutralization of Korea and editor of the Koria Kyoron (Korean 
Review), a Japanese magazine dedicated to neutralism, he 
proposed a neutralization of Korea with the following statement: 
125. Donga Ilbo (November 6, 1960). 
126. Donga Ilbo (October 3, 1960). 
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The two regimes in Korea are the creatures of the rival 
powers of the world, in that ·they represent the interest of 
their respective sponsors, the two regimes should be dissolved 
and a nationwide general election should be held to elect a 
new national assembly thai would adopt a new constitution, 
neutrality of the unified Korea should then be guaranteed by 
international agreements, and no foreign military base be 
permitted to be established in Korea.127 
This neutralization proposal was again unacceptable to the 
Chang Myon Government. Its impact, however, was enormous in 
South Korea and along with Senator Mansfield's proposal it was 
probably one of the most discussed issues in South Korea, 
particularly on college campuses. Adding to this acrimonious 
situation, the new American posture toward the Soviet Union 
initiated by President John Kennedy also stimulated more lively 
discussion about the possibility of neutralization of Korea in a 
changing world. 
To face this situation,· Chang Myon's Government needed a 
strong governing ability. However, the police force, once a strong 
organization and target of public criticism, was not allowed to 
function properly. The weakened executive body could not control 
the National Assembly and the leadership of the Democratic 
Party could not control the party members. The government could 
control neither students nor street hoodlums. At certain points, 
Premier Chang Myon could not even control his own cabinet in 
defining public policy. The Government's lack of a governing 
capability made it impotent when confronted by op_position on a 
specific issue such as the unification question, which had 
extremely high symbolic and emotional value. In this situation, 
Chang Myon perhaps was well aware that it would be almost 
impossible to mobilize public support for any of his unification 
policy. As a consequence, Chang's Government was compelled to 
react cautiously to domestic and foreign stimuli, and the 
preservative, namely status quo, policy in directing the unification 
policy was a direct result of this cautious reaction to internal and 
external inputs. 
127. Kim Sam Kyu, Chosen No Genjitsu (The Reality of Korea) (Tokyo: 
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3. Unification Policy of the Third Republic, 
1961 to the Present 
On May 16, 1961, a military coup dissolved the much troubled 
Second Republic and the Military Revolutionary Council ruled 
South Korea. The Military Council made a few pledges regarding 
unification policy. They stated that: 
Anti-Communism will be the cardinal point of national 
policy and the nation's anti-Communist alignment, which 
has thus far been no more than a matter of convention and a 
mere slogan, will be rearranged and strengthened. 
In order to implement the long-cherished national desire to 
reunify the divided land, all-out efforts will be directed 
toward making the nation capable of coping with Commu-
nism.128 
This statement made it quite clear that "the anti-Communist 
alignment will be strengthened." It also states that "all-out efforts 
will be directed toward making the nation capable of coping with 
Communism." While making known its position concerning 
unification, the military government made mass arrests of 
members of leftist-oriented groups in South Korea. Hence all vocal 
exponents of political negotiation with North Korea were soon 
silenced. This extremely intransigent attitude toward North Korea 
was continued during the entire period of the military government 
in South Korea. 
This militant attitude was somewhat changed after the 
restoration of civilian government under the Third Republic. The 
ruling Democratic Republican Party suggested a unification plan 
on September 3, 1963. According to that plan: 
1. Korean unification would be achieved through a national 
election in the South and the North under the principle of 
free democracy and under the rightful supervision of the 
United Nations. 
2. The proper attitude for victory against Communism would 
be completely disseminated throughout all areas of 
politics, economy, education, culture, and so forth. 
128. Donga flbo (May 16, 1961). 
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3. In order to prepare a unification policy and a policy for 
after the unification, a research institute for the study of 
the unification would be created.129 
In the same year, Kim Chong Pil, who was then assumed to 
be the second most powerful member of the Third Republic 
Government, stated in a speech presented to the student body of 
Seoul National University that: 
1. It is possible to unify Korea through a Third World War, 
but it is highly unrealistic to expect unification to occur 
through such an event. 
2. A second alternative would be a unification achieved by a 
civil war such as the Korean War of June 25, 1950. 
However, it is neither possible under the present interna-
tional condition, nor desirable on my part. 
3. Therefore, in order to achieve unification under the 
method which we desire, we ought to strengthen our 
economic ability .1ao 
Prime Minister Chung 11 Kwon stated, on October 26, 1964, 
the South Korean Government policy on reunification. According 
to the statement, unification must be achieved "through an all-
Korean election based upon population ratio under the U.N. 
supervision."131 Then President Park made it quite clear on 
November 27, 1964 that even though the election is conducted 
under the U.N. supervision, "if the supervisory body is not 
guaranteed a fair election, our government will not accept it."132 
Since the end of 1965, there have been a number of new 
developments regarding unification policies in Korea. In March 
1969, South Korea established a cabinet-level National Unifica-
tion Board whose function is essentially the study of unification 
problems. More noticeably, President Park of South Korea 
publicly invited North Korea in 1970 to join a "bonafide 
competition in development, in national construction and in 
creativity."133 Then on August 12, 1971, the South Korea Red 
129. Donga Ilbo (September 3, 1963). 
130. Donga Ilbo (November 6, 1963). 
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Cross Society formally proposed to the North a joint effort to 
reunify those families separated by the division of Korea. About 
two months later, North Korea accepted the proposal and 
subsequently the Red Cross talks began on September 20, 1971. 
A surprising development occurred when a joint communique, 
signed by Lee Hoo Pak, then Director of the South Korean CIA, 
and Kim Young Chu, Director of the Organization Bureau of the 
Korean Worker's Party, was announced in early April 1972. 
According to the communique, there were seven points of 
agreement reached between North and South Korea. One of the 
agreements stated that "reunification must be based on three 
principles, independence from and noninterference by outside 
forces, peaceful means to achieve unification, and acknowledge-
ment that national unity transcended ideological and system 
differences. "134 
Since this agreement was reached, there have been a number 
of mutual exchanges of delegates between the two Koreas in order 
to seek some solutions to the Korean questions. Contrary to public 
expectations, however, there have not been any indications that 
long standing differences can be resolved in the near future. The 
delegates have never been able to solve any issues such as the 
issues of family reunions, methods to achieve unification, the 
issue of the U.N. membership, and so forth. Meanwhile, South 
Korea continues to publicize its position on reunification. 
President Park issued a special statement regarding his reunifica-
tion policy on June 23, 1974. In that statement, he suggested that 
"the South and North should neither interfere in each other's 
internal affairs nor commit aggression on each other in order to 
maintain peace on the Korean peninsula, and that we for our part 
would exert our utmost effort to achieve peaceful unification of the 
country by continuing, with sincerity and patience, our efforts to 
secure concrete results from the South-North dialogue." Park 
furthermore stated that "the North Korean side, in diametrical 
opposition to our foreign policy statement, counter-proposed a 
number of unrealistic and stereotyped ideas for political propa-
ganda purposes, such as a so-called "Grand National Conference" 
of the 'Confederation' of the South and the North."135 Chang Key 
134. See "The Joint Statement of North and South Korea," Korea Forum, v. I 
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Young, then South Korean co-chairman of the South-North 
coordinating committee again reiterated the "non-interference 
policy" of South Korea and urged North Korea to enter the United 
Nations as a separate entity.136 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
South Korea issued a statement on April 29, 1975, and again 
urged North Korea "to take a sincere attitude to expedite the 
South-North dialogue by upholding the charter of the United 
Nations and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations on the 
Korean questions."137 President Park, again, made clear in a 
speech given on August 15, 1977, that in order to achieve an 
independent reunification of Korea, an open dialogue between the 
North and the South must come first. The open dialogue will then 
lead to a mutual friendship, which will eventually lead to an all-
Korean free election for the unification. 138 On March 4, 1978, Min 
Kwan Sik, South Korean Acting Co-Chairman of the South-North 
Coordinating Committee proposed an immediate reopening of 
dialogue between the two Koreas. He made a statement that 
should there be a normalization of the dialogue and cooperation of 
technological exchanges between two sides, then there would be 
tremendous progress of the entire nation. 139 
This analysis of the Third Republic's unification policy 
requires that a few further observations be made on the policy. 
First, the function of the U.N. has always been a prime requisite 
in the consideration of the operation process effecting unification. 
The only organization acceptable to South Korean authorities for 
supervising the election was the U.N. Cognizant of the fact that 
U.N. supervision might never be acceptable to North Korea, South 
Korea was tactically indicating its intransigency to North Korea. 
Second, anti-Communist propaganda for the purpose of 
arousing patriotic fever was revived. Moreover, after the military 
coup, the South Korean government strongly reinforced and 
strenghtened its anti-Communist posture in the society. Many 
South Koreans were once again, as during President Rhee's 
regime, forced to frequently profess anti-Communism in order to 
prove their loyalty. 
Third, South Korean policy behavior was transformed 
gradually in a fashion that demonstrated internal restructuring 
136. See Journal of Korean Affairs (October, 1974), pp. 51-55. 
137. See Journal of Korean Affairs (April, 1975), pp. 78-79. 
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was on going to meet external conditions. Internal policy, 
therefore, had a higher priority than achieving unification. Thus 
Kim Chong Pil's slogan that "in order to achieve the unification 
as we want to, we ought to strengthen our economic capacity," 
became an implicit policy of Park's government. Therefore, the 
idea of first building the strength to fight communism domesti-
cally, then later negotiating a peaceful settlement with the North, 
is a consistent attitude of South Korean leadership regarding 
national unification. In this respect, though the unification issue 
has a high degree of emotional and symbolic capacity among the 
Korean people, the South Korean leadership does not want to take 
any risks in order to achieve it. Therefore, though Rhee's 
intransigent policy toward North Korea slowly became trans-
formed into a preservative one under the Second Republic, the 
different South Korean leaderships consistently put forth unifica-
tion strategies that borrow time for the purpose of strengthening 
South Korea first. 
The question remains, why has the Third Republic behaved in 
such a manner. There are several factors which contributed to 
such behavior. First, one reason is related to the political problems 
of South Korea. Particularly, this may be traced back to the 
nature of the military coup of May 16, 1961. Under the Second 
Republic the unification by neutralization of Korea was openly 
discussed. Some of th.e students attempted to march to Panmun-
jom to talk to North Korean students. The movement for 
neutralist unification appeared to many Koreans to be influenced 
by the Communists. As pointed out by Stephen Bradner, this was 
a matter for concern to "many Army officers who might well lose 
their lives as well as their jobs if neutralism should tum out to 
mean Communism."140 Moreover, on this occasion Premier Chang 
Myon pledged to diminish the size of the military forces. This was 
quite shocking to many Army career officers. Thus Chang's 
planned reduction of military forces was perceived by many 
officers as personally deleterious and as an unwanted weakening 
of the defensive posture against the Communists. 
Furthermore, many of those members who actively partici-
pated in the coup were political refugees from North Korea and 
consequently, vociferous anti-Communists. A good example of 
these military political refugees was Major General of the Marine 
Corps, Kim Dong Ha, one of the three most important figures in 
140. Stephen Bradner, loc. cit., p. 415. 
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the military coup. One of the main attractions which induced him 
to join the military coup was his faith in anti-Communism.141 
Many of the important members in Junta, including Colonels Pak 
Chang Am, Pak Chi Ok, and Lieutenant General Pak Im Hang, 
were well-known staunch anti-Communists and Northerners. This 
anti-communist disposition of the military was clearly reflected in 
the unification policy after the coup. Thus the adoption of the 
statement that "anti-Communism will be the cardinal point of 
national policy" as the first revolutionary pledge was understan-
dable. Even after the establishment of the Third Republic, 
President Park's leadership was continually and strongly sup-
ported by Korean military groups. Furthermore, a large number of 
former military men were recruited into various governmental and 
private industries. The interlocking relationship between military 
groups and governmental organizations strongly affected the 
policy of the unification. Many military men participated directly 
in the civilian government. The political justification to the South 
Korean public, explaining the massive employment of military 
men in civilian posts and the preserving . of a large military 
establishment, was that only a strong military was capable of 
resisting a communist attack on South Korea. This political 
justification in tum shaped the attitude of President Park 
toward North Korea. 
Another political factor was related to the constant internal 
factional struggles in the leadership of the military government 
which occurred during the early 1960's. From June 1961 to May 
1963 alone, thirteen anti-revolutionary or counter-revolutionary 
cases were discovered. One of the first major cases was the 
conflict between Lieutenant General Chang Do Young and his 
immediate associates, most whom had Northwest backgrounds, 
and President Park's followers. Dissatisfied with the erosion of his 
power, Chang Do Young began rebuilding his own factional 
strength with the support of both the Northwestern and Christian 
leaders. According to the Supreme Council's report, Chang 
planned to install Paik N ak J oon, former President of a university 
as well as former President of the House of Councilors under the 
Second Republic, to be the head of the Cabinet.142 Chang's plan 
was discovered before it was launched. It was announced that 
"the CIA has discovered a plot to assassinate the central figures 
141. Se-Jin Kim, op. cit., p. 93. 
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of the revolution by anti-revolutionary forces led by Lieutenant 
General Chang Do Young and 45 others."143 
Before the wounds of factional conflict were healed, another 
conflict erupted. This time the conflict was between the second 
strongest man, Kim Chong Pil, and the third most powerful man, 
Marine Major General Kim Dong Ha in the military revolutionary 
echelon. Eventually this conflict ended when Kim Dong Ha's 
attempted coup was thwarted by the Korean CIA. Then Kim Jong 
Pil, the head of the hard-line group, resigned from the chairman-
ship of the newly created Democratic Republic Party on February 
25, 1963, and left for an eight-month foreign tour.144 
During the rule of the military government constant factional 
conflicts plagued Park's leadership and frequently created 
difficulties in delineating policy direction. Even after the restora-
tion of civil government the highly conservative military sector 
attempted to influence governmental policy. One example is the 
attempted coup led by Colonel Chung Y eun Won who was former 
Chief Secretary of Public Information in the Supreme Council. 
This coup attempt of May 7, 1965, clearly indicated that some 
factions in the military had never been brought under control 
even after the transfer of power. The factional conflict within the 
ruling leadership continued up to 1973 in a somewhat different 
mode. That is to say, while attempted military coups have ceased, 
factional conflict has continued in the party. Thus the Democratic 
Republican Party has been constantly plagued with factional 
struggle up to 1973 with a variety of political issues. 
It appears that when factional conflicts developed within the 
military and the ruling party structure the tendency toward 
reinforcing the conventional norm, that is, anti-Communism, was 
extremely heightened. Virtually every factional leader within the 
ruling leadership claimed to be a real champion of anti-
communism. When factional conflict is widely exposed among 
leaders of factions who have military backgrounds anti-
communist dogma becomes even more vociferous. This political 
factor has clearly induced or at least greatly influenced the 
intransigent position of President Park's leadership toward North 
Korea. This, in turn, has influenced South Korean governmental 
policy on the unification issue. 
143. Hankuk Ilbo (July 9, 1961). 
144. See Se-Jin Kim, op. cit., p. 116. 
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Beside these factional conflicts, there was another element 
contributing to the instability of the political system under the 
Third Republic. As soon as the junta announced that the 
presidential election was to be held October 15, 1963, leaders of 
opposition groups charged wrong-doing to Chung Hee Par. One 
critical charge was brought by Y oon Bo Sun, the strongest 
opposition candidate for the presidency. While campaigning in 
September, Y oon charged that "there are in government those 
who were involved in the rebellion in Y osu and Soonchon." This 
was an indirect attack on Park's involvement in the rebellion 
which was a communist-led military revolt in 1948 in South 
Korea. Furthermore, Y oon made the accusation on October 9, 
1963, that the "Democratic Republican Party was organized long 
before the elections owing to the political fund made available by 
the Communist Party of North Korea, and that Kim Chong Pil 
had contacts with Hwang Tae Sung," an influential member of 
the North Korean regime.145 
This criticism of Park aroused great attention throughout the 
country. Thus Park was not only plagued by the internal 
instability within the military group, but was also heavily 
attacked by the rightist groups. Park had an even more difficult 
situation to face as the result of the election. Park barely managed 
to win the election by a plurality of 42.6 percent. Therefore, had 
the opposition groups united effectively, Yoon Bo Sun would have 
won the election by a comfortable margin. Furthermore, the 
unpopularity of Park's government continued, particularly in city 
or urban areas where the educational level of the population was 
relatively high. Park again faced tough opposition in 1967, even 
though Park this time managed to win a majority. Then the South 
Korean constituion was amended in 1969 to permit President Park 
to run in 1972 for his third term. This movement faced a 
stormy opposition in South Korea. Then the constitution was 
again amended in 1972, to preserve a lifetime presidency for Park. 
This Yushin (Revitalization) constitution, which was created in 
1972, again created a measure of political suspicion among 
Koreans. Of course, no public criticism was allowed upon its 
promulgation. The new constitution amassed enormous power for 
President Park. These various political factors put the ruling 
leadership in a precarious position in terms of pursuing an 
innovative and adventurous policy regarding the unification. 
145. John Oh, op. cit., p. 166. 
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Second, the social factor also contributed heavily to South 
Korean unification policy. One component of the social factor was 
related to the social discontent caused by economic and social 
conditions. President Chung Hee Park personally wrote that the 
first order of business for the government was the purification of 
corrupted politics and an all-out effort to achieve economic 
improvement.146 However, due to an ill-perceived economic 
condition and mismanagement of economic policies in terms of 
planning and monetary policies, the government could neither 
swiftly eliminate an inflationary spiral, nor relieve the chronic 
unemployment. This worsening economic condition continued 
until South Korea made a politically and economically profitable 
decision to aid the defense of South Vietnam. Adding to these 
economic difficultues and worsening the government's public 
image were the endless and large-scale social scandals continuing 
from the Second Republic into the Third Republic. It was reported 
that a vast sum of money had been swindled by high levels of 
political leaders in the course of economic activities ranging from 
importing foreign cars to manipulating stock markets. 
Mindful that social discontent would lead to criticism of his 
leadership, Park's government began to regulate the press. This 
attempt aroused severe criticism among press, people, and even 
National Assembly members. Then Park's government started 
suppressing this criticism. Later the government's negotiation 
with Japan brought to the streets chronic, bitter, and often bloody 
student demonstrations. Eventually, in response to continuing 
student agitation, the government ordered the universities to expel 
a number of student leaders and professors for being involved in 
the demonstrations. The government very often sent troops to 
college campuses to suppress demonstrations. These governmen-
tal actions shocked the public.147 
Though the economic and living conditions were beginning to 
substantially improve in South Korea, various social discontents 
never ended. Large-scale student demonstrations reappeared in 
reaction to the June 1967 elections. The government's efforts to 
solve this problem by using increased police power increased the 
number of violent incidents. The constitutional amendments of 
1969 and 1972 again created restlessness throughout the college 
146. Park Chung Hee, Kukkawa Hyokyongkwa na (The Country, the Revolu-
tion and I) (Seoul: Hyang Moon Sa, 1963), P- 60. 
147. See David Cole and Princeton Lyman, Korean Development: The Interplay 
of Politics and Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,l971), pp. 69--77. 
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campuses. With these political fluctuations the news media 
increased its criticism of the government. In turn, the government 
once more suppressed newspapers. One of the most representative 
examples would be the case of a famous daily newspaper Donga 
Ilbo in 1975. Stung by editorial criticism, the government coerced 
businessmen to stop advertising in Donga Ilbo. Within a few 
months, editorial criticism decreased. 
Colleges were frequently forced to close their doors. To cope 
with this problem, the government adopted in 1976 a new tenure 
law for college professors which resulted in the ousting of more 
than 400 professors from their posts.148 This kind of tense 
situation became a social input to the unification policy position 
of South Korea. 
Third, various external factors also contributed to the policy 
of South Korean unification. One of the external factors involved 
North Korean actions toward South Korea. While North Korea 
continuously proposed a peaceful unification, its hostility toward 
South Korea was increasingly virulent. There was a dramatic 
increase in North Korean violations in the DMZ. In 1967 alone 
there were 423 reported major incidents and 117 minor incidents 
involving North Koreans in the DMZ. The North Korean 
violations of the armistice drastically increased up to 1976. 
Furthermore, North Korea attempted massive infiltration into 
South Korea. For example, in 1967 alone there were 215 armed 
clashes between North Korean infiltrators and the South Korean 
army, as well as with the police force. A number of major 
incidents reported in South Korean territory in the late 1960's 
have already been discussed. 
North Korean infiltration continued, while the North-South 
Korean talks which started in 1972 were being held. One of the 
most dramatic incidents occurred on March 19, 1975. On that day, 
the U.N. Command in South Korea revealed that a second 
underground tunnel had been constructed by North Korea. 
According to military sources in South Korea, not only motor 
vehicles, but also certain types of field-artillery weapons could 
have passed through this tunnel. It was apparently intended for a 
large scale infiltration of North Korean manpower into the South. 
In addition to this illegitimate way of infiltration there had 
reportedly been a number of cases of North Korean attempts to 
infiltrate legitimate political activities in South Korea. By doing 
148. See New York Times (March 14, 1976). 
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so, North Korea could cultivate the elements of the anti-
government movements in the South. One of the organizations 
which eventually surfaced was the famous Tonghyok Tang 
(Revolutionary Unification Party). Then on August 18, 1976, 
North Korean soldiers killed two American officers, and injured 
four other American servicemen and five South Korean soldiers at 
the DMZ of Panmunjon. On July 14, 1977, a U.S. Army helicopter 
was shot down by North Korea over the North Korean side of the 
DMZ. Three crewmen were killed and one crew member was 
wounded. All of these activities strongly reinforced many South 
Korean's suspicions of North Korean motivation and attitude. 
Another external factor was related to the U.S. involvement in 
the Vietnam conflict and its subsequent policy of detente with 
Communist China and the Soviet Union. South Korea fought with 
the U.S. soldiers against North Vietnam with determination and 
sincerity. However, as the war effort soured South Korea correctly 
perceived that lack of support among the American people forced 
the U.S. government to withdraw from South Vietnam. This 
withdrawal created a grave skepticism among Koreans about the 
U.S. capacity and willingness to protect any of its allies, including 
South Korea. South Korea was also beginning to realize that even 
if political elites wanted to protect South Korea, there was no 
assurance of getting protection from the U.S. government. This 
erosion of confidence rapidly increased during the post-Watergate 
period. Particularly, South Korea saw the liberalizing effect on the 
American people of detente-related cultural and economic activi-
ties with Communist political systems. Then South Korea also 
witnessed President Nixon's historic visit to Peking in February 
1972, and Japanese Premier Tanaka's official visit there in 
September of the same year. This created not only a skepticism 
about the will and capacity of the U.S. promise, but also a new 
sense of anxiety and uneasiness among most Koreans. Realizing 
it could no longer rely solely upon the U.S. shield, South Korea felt 
strongly compelled to avoid the tragedy that South Vietnam 
experienced. One of the most fatal blows to South Korea was the 
U.S. decision to withdraw American ground forces from the 
Korean Peninsula. Though knowledgeable Koreans speculated on 
the possibility, to most South Koreans it came as a surprise. Many 
South Koreans believed that there was a serious military 
imbalance, particularly in the air force, between North and South 
Korea. Therefore, many Koreans felt that the possibility of North 
Korean attacks against the South was emminent. Even though 
Defense Secretary Harold Brown assured Koreans by stating on 
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February 20, 1978, that "we are and will remain a major force in 
the Pacific,"149 South Korean uneasiness over the decision became 
quite serious. South Koreans, furthermore, witnessed an erosion of 
their support in the American Congress due to the Korean 
lobbying scandal known as Koreagate. In response to these 
problems, President Park launched an ambitious economic and 
military program150 to offset the perceived deficiency in the 
military capability of South Korea. 
This in turn resulted in a hardening attitude by South Korea 
toward Northern Communists. While perceiving the mood of 
detente and pullout of the U.S. shield, the South Korean 
government knew it could no longer advocate a policy of 
unification by "marching to the North" as President Rhee did. On 
the other hand, internal and external conditions made it difficult 
for South Korea to accept a policy of peacefully negotiated 
unification with North Korea. Meanwhile, among new issues 
created by the mood of detente, and fluctuations in the interna-
tional relations, the unification of Korea remained the most 
emotional and symbolic issue to practically all South Koreans. 
Therefore, the attitude of "First build the strength to fight 
Communism, then negotiate a settlement with the North" 
appeared to be a very cogent policy to the South Korean leaders of 
the Third Republic. A cautious preserving of the status quo by the 
Third Republic government was the result of these domestic and 
external factors. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The reunification of Korea is a highly emotional issue to 
Koreans. It persists as a sacrosanct political symbol in the minds 
and hearts of Koreans. Furthermore, Koreans believe that the 
division was unnaturally and arbitrarily created by foreign 
powers against the Korean will. The division has also caused 
traumas and tragedies to Koreans. Because of the division, many 
families are still separated. Family reunions can only be treasured 
hopes. The division has also substantially restrained the prosper-
ous economic development of Korea. 
All of the considerations discussed in this paper make 
reunification a most sensitive political issue. The dream of 
149. See New York Times (February 21, 1978). 
150. See Sungjoo Han, "South Korea 1977: Preparing For Self-Reliance," Asian 
Survey (January, 1977), pp. 52-57. 
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reunification is kept alive by these considerations, but they also 
keep it a dream. Because of the popular desire to make the dream 
come true, South Korean politicians find they are constantly 
pressured to take a stand on the issue. Understandably, this 
impetus generates and very often formulates the governmental 
policy of unification. The internal and external condition of 
Korea, however, has constantly been in fluctuation. Naturally, the 
governmental policy of reunification has also had to undergo 
changes. To cope with domestic and international environmental 
change South Korean unification policy has gradually and slowly 
been remolded. Undoubtedly, this process will continue, because of 
its importance to Korean hearts, and to domestic and interna-
tional peace. Continued systematic study of Korean unification 
policy remains an imperative for political scientists in the future. 
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